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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
November 9, 1984 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 4 
No. 84-468 
(V.-
CITY OF CLEBURNE, TEX., et al. 
v. 
CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER, et al. 
(group housing sponsor) 
Cert to CAS (Clark, 
Goldberg, Politz) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petrs argue that mentally retarded persons 
are not a "quasi-suspect" class for equal protection purposes 
and that legislation affecting such persons should not be 
subjected to an "intermediate" or "heightened" level of 
~·  scrutiny. ~-·. ~ n ~C ~ 
~ ~ a: ~ ~ 9-~-c. 0'-
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' 2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: Resp Cleburne Living 
Centers, Inc. ("CLC") operates supervised group homes for the 
mentally retarded. The center plans to establish such a home 
in Cleburne for 13 men and women who are mildly or moderately 
retarded. They would receive 24-hour supervision from CLC 
staff members, working in 8-hour shifts. The residents would 
have jobs in the community and in a work activity center. The 
DC found such homes to be "the principal living alternatives 
for persons who are mentally retarded." 
The applicable zoning ordinance for the proposed location 
permits in part: 
"2. Apartment houses, or multiple dwellings. 
3. Boarding and lodging houses. 
4. Fraternity or sorority houses and 
dormitories. 
5. Apartment hotels. 
6. Hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes or 
homes for convalescents or aged, other than 
for the insane or feeble-minded or alcoholics 
or drug addicts [emphasis added]." 
Apparently a group house for mentally retarded persons falls 
within the l ho~tal-for-the-feeble-minded category. Another 
section of the zoning ordinance requires that a special use 
permit be obtained from the City Council for such hospitals 
---../ 
located within Cleburne. The permit must be renewed annually. 
Resps applied for a special use permit, which was denied 
by the City Council after a public hearing based on the 
following factors: 
"1. the attitude of a majority of owners of 
peroperty located within two hundred (200) 
feet of [the proposed location]; 
2. the location of a junior high school 
across the street ••. ; 
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3. concern for the fears of elderly residents 
of the neighborhood; 
4. the size of the home and the number of 
people to be housed; 
5. concern over the legal responsibility of 
CLC for any actions which the mentally 
retarded residents might take; 
6. the home's location on a five hundred 
(500) year flood plain; and 
7. in general, the presentation made before 
the City Council." 
After exhausting administrative remedies, resps sued for an 
injunction in~D.T:x., which denied relief. 
The~S reversed. It considered the classification of 
mentally retarded persons for equal protection purposes to be 
~~ --... 
a question of first impression. It held that "although mental 
retardates are not a suspect class, they do share enough of 
the characteristics of a suspect class to warrant heightened ..______ 
scrutiny." It reasoned that they historically have been .......__ ---
subject to discrimination based on deep-seated prejudice, 
"have been segregated in remote, stigmatizing institution " 
this segregation has perpetuated public ignorance and 
pejudice, they lack political power to protect their 
interests, and their condition is immutable. 
Having settled on a heightened standard of review, the 
CAS then held the special permit requirement of the zoning 
ordinance unconstitutional on its face. It determined that 
the means employed by· the zoning ordinance did not 
substantially further any important governmental interest. It 
of the statute to be legitimate, 
e.g., avbiding undue concentrations of population and ensuring 
safety from fire and other dangers, but held that singling out 
- 4 -
group homes for mentally retarded persons, while allowing 
home for the elderly and other group living situations, was 
not well tailored to these objectives. Alternatively, the CAS 
applied. It determined that the reasons given for the 
~-~ 
~ 
held the special permit requirement unconstitutional as 
Council's denial of the permit did not substantially further 
any important governmental interest justifying the 
discriminatory classification. 
The CAS denied rehearing en bane 9-6. The dissenting 
statement a;.gued that unlike the mentally retarded the quasi-
suspect classications previously recognized--women and 
illegitimates--"are not generally different from the rest of 
society in terms of their needs and abilities to function." 
Finally, the CAS recalled and stayed its mandate pending cert. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petrs first argue that the CAS's 
decision in this case conflicts with the CA9's decision in 
California Association of the Physically Handicappped, Inc. v. 
Federal Communications Commission, 721 F.2d 667 (1983), an 
earlier CAS decision in Brown v. Sibley, 6SO F.2d 760 (1981), 
and the principles established in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 
U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (BRENNAN, J.) (distinguishing "sex from 
such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical 
disability" on the ground that "the sex characteristic 
frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or 
contribute to society."). 
Petrs next argue that conferring quasi-suspect status on 
mentally retarded persons will interfere with legitimate state 
- s -
and federal legislation designed to help ' them. Moreover, the 
treatment of the mentally retarded is a subject for 
legislative, not judicial, action. The rights of the 
handicapped, including the mentally retarded, are already 
protected by legislation such as §S04 of the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973, 29 u.s.c. §794, and the Texas Mentally Retarded 
Persons Act of 1977, Tex. Civil Code Ann. Art. SS47-300. 
Finally, petrs challenge the reasoning that led the CAS 
to conclude that the mentally retarded should be teated as a 
quasi-suspect class. They argue that the public is much more 
enlightened today than in the past as to the nature of mental 
retardation, that the mentally retarded are no longer a 
politically powerless group, and that their condition is 
significantly dissimilar from the population generally. 
Resps argue that there is no conflict and that this Court 
should await more decisions in the lower courts. They argue 
that California Association of the Physically Handicapped and 
Sibley both involved physical handicaps and not mental 
retardation. They further argue that the CAS's decision is a 
narrow one dealing with "intentional, invidious 
discrimination" and exclusion from "the enjoyment of a basic 
benefit available to nearly everyone else--the right to live 
in a community." It does not involve judicial interference 
with allocation of public resources or a balancing between the 
needs of mentally retarded persons and the needs of others. 
Moreover, the impact of the decision will be limited as many 
state legislatures are passing state zoning laws ensuring the 
- 6 -
availability of community-based living alternatives for 
mentally retarded persons. Finally, citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 
U.S. 202 (1982), resps argue that the intermediate level of 
scrutiny is approprite where persons not responsible for their 
status are seeking access on equal terms to basic societal 
benefits. 
4. DISCUSSION: Resps are correct that the two circuit 
cases cited by petrs deal with ~al handicaps and n~ 
mental retardation. Moreover, these cases merely hold that 
"'---· --- -----. 
the physically handicapped are not a suspect class and do not 
address the possibility that they are a quasi-suspect class 
entitled to an intermediate standard of review. On the other 
hand, four of the six Justices in the cert pool dissented in 
Plyler, apparently rejecting an intermediate level of equal 
protection scrutiny. See 457 u.s., at 248 (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting), and this case seems to be a futher extension of --------.....__ 
While there is not yet a full-blown 
conflict in the circuits, this is an important case with 
potentially far-reaching ramifications. 
I recommend grant. 
There is a response. 
October 31, 1984 Vickery Opn in ptn. 
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I 'I 2-_7 
City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center 
Questions Presented 
{1) Did CAS err in holding that classifications based on mental 
retardation are quasi-suspect and thus subject to heightened 
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause? 
( 2) Does petr 's zoning ordinance violate the Equal Protection 
Clause, either on its face or as applied, under the .. rational 




In San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 
(1973), your opinion for the Court described a "suspect" class as 
one "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a 
history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a 
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary 
prot~tion from the majoritarian political process." !d., at 28. 
The "traditional indicia of suspectness" usually also include 
whether the class is a discrete and insular minority, United 
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 u.s. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938), 
and whether membership in the class is based on immutable 
charcteristics. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 u.s. 677, 686 
(1973). 
to demonstrate that mentally retarded 
individuals do not share many of the characteristics of suspect -- ~--------------------------------------------------------
classes is unconvincin • For example, the fact that there are 
varying degrees of mental retardation does not undermine the 
claim that the mentally retarded are a discrete and insular 
Indeed, petrs' zoning ordinance apparently ~1 l ~ 
class of mentally retarded individuals is "large, diverse and 
amorphous." Likewise, the fact that the mentally retarded can 
learn to do things does not mean that their condition is not 
I I 
immutable. Mental retardation is a ~earning disabili!J that does 
not go away, even though some mentally retarded individuals 
eventually can learn some things to some degree. Petrs are right 




retarded has occurred recently. Still, in the face of the 
historical mistreatment suffered by this minority, I doubt that 
recent successes are enough to ensure that some degree of 
heightened protection from the political process is no longer 
necessary. In sum, I think there is a strong argument that the 
mentally retarded share enough of the characteristics of a 
suspect class to make heightened review appropriate. 
~-------------------------~ 
The SG takes a different approach in arguing for reversal • ---- ~--------------------
The SG argues that heightened scrutiny is never appropriate when 
members of the identified 
t I 
class possess special 
....... 
needs and 
abilities that are relevant to proper governmental choices. 
Since the mentally retarded do have special needs and abilities, 
the SG contends that all legislation using this classification 
should be scrutinized by the rational relationship test. The SG 
relies on isolated statements in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 
~ 
u.s. 677 (1973), and Mass. Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 
u.s. 307 (1976), for his view. 
~r.--~~~ don't think the SG's view is compelled by the Court's 
··~-- - v .t-1 ~precedents. Both Frontiero and ~urgia do mention the relevance 
of individual characteristics to the ability to perform in 
society in distinguishing suspect from nonsuspect classes. The 
Court has never held, however, that this is the threshold 
requirement for suspect classes. Even if such a requirement 
should be established, the Court need not impose it on quasi-
suspect classes. Additionally when the challenged legislation or 
governmental action does not involve one's ability to perform, it 
is not clear why the relevance of a particular characteristic to 
\ 
4. 
the ability to perform should be the li trnus test of suspect 
classes. In sum, I think the SG' s argument shows ~nJ.y that - ::::;:::::::..: 
legislation treating the mentally retarded differently from other 
people to pass constitutional muster even when 
reviewed with strict or heightened scrutiny. 
Although I believe that there is a strong case for affirming 
CA8 's holding that the mentally retarded are a quasi-suspect 
class, I 'rn not sure whether the Court need reach this issue in 
-----~-----------------------------------~-----------------------this case. ___..... 
under the 
It appears that the City's action might fail 
rational relationship test. At least some of 
even 
the 
City's proffered justifications for denying the special use 
permit would apply equally whether the residents of the horne were 
retarded or not. Others -- like the attitudes of neighbors --
are attempts to justify discriminatory treatment because of the 
existence of prejudice. Thus, although some of the goals of the ) 
ordinance and the reasons for denying the permit sound perfectly 
legitimate, they appear to have no relationship whatsoever to the 
fact that the residents are mentally retarded. I will have to 
check the record on this point, but it looks like the City's 
~ action can be held unconstitutional as applied under the rational J 
~relationship test. I note that the State of Texas filed an~ 
~· J- ----1 -------~ 
~icus brief urgin 
~'-
~ Finally, one of the 
case is moot. The National Ass'n for Rights Protection and ---Advocacy notes that under present Texas law, the group horne 
proposed by resps exceeds the maximum size and thus even if this 
Court finds in resps' favor, it will have no effect on their 
5. 
ability to open the home. According to the amicus, the lower 
courts did not find that a prior Texas regulation, under which 
the size of resp' s home was acceptable, applied in this case 
despite the change in the law. I will have to consult the record 
on this point. 
Recommendation 
I tentatively recommend affirming. 
v~ 
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To: Justice Powell 
From: Annmarie 
Re: No. 84-468, City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living 
After hearing the oral argument, my recommendation is 
to affirm CAS on the ground that the mentally retarded 
··------should be treated as a quasi-suspect class. I think it is 
~
clear that the mentally retarded share the characteristics 
identified in the Court's decisions as those triggering 
strict scrutiny. As you described suspect classes in San 
Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, suspect class are 
those that have been "saddled with such disabilities, or 
subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, 
or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness 
as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian 
political process." 411 u.s. 1, 28 (1973). The "tradition-
al indicia of suspectness" also include whether the class is 
~ 
"a discrete and insular minority", United States v. Carolene 
Products, 304 u.s. 144, 152-153 n.4 (1938), and whether 
class membership is based on immutable characteristics. 
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 u.s. 677, 686 (1973). I don't 
t 
think a convincing argument can be made that the mentally 
retarded do not have these characteristics. 
2. 
Only two arguments were raised against finding the men-
tally retarded to be a quasi-suspect class: (1) a general 
objection that the Court should not expand the number of 
classes that receive heightened scrutiny; (2) a claim that 
mental retardation is different from other suspect classes 
because it frequently relates to the ability to perform in 
society. I am not persuaded by either of these objections. 
It is true, of course, that the application of heightened 
scrutiny entails "extraordinary protection" from the demo-
cratic process and thus that the Court should impose it only 
when absolutely necessary. When a class satisfies the cri-
teria the Court has established for heightened scrutiny, 
however, I don't think a general reluctance to expand the 
number of groups subject to this protection is a sufficient 
to hold otherwise. 
The relationship between mental retardation and the 
ability to perform in society is irrelevant to the question 
whether the mentally retarded should be a quasi-suspect 
class. The Court has never held that the lack of any rela-
tionship between a characteristic and the ability to perform 
is a threshold requirement for such status. Moreover, the 
fact that such a relationship may exist means only that leg-
islation based on the difference to perform will pass con-
stitutional muster, even under heightened scrutiny. The 
fact that mental retardation sometimes may be a proper basis 
3. 
for a legislative classification is a good reason to make 
the class quasi-suspect instead of suspect; it is not a good 
reason to find that the mentally retarded should receive no 
heightened scrunity at all. 
For these reasons, I would affirm CAS. 
1st DRAFT 







From: Justice White 
Circulated: MAY 2 ~ 1985 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-468 
CITY OF CLEBURNE, TEXAS, ET AL., PETITIONERS 
v. CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1985] 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
A Texas city denied a special use permit for the operation 
of a group home for the mentally retarded, acting pursuant to 
a municipal zoning ordinance requiring permits for such 
homes. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that 
mental retardation is a "quasi: suspect" classification and that 
the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause because it 
did not substantially further an important governmental pur-
pose. Because we conclude that a lesser standard of scru-
ti~iate, we reverse and remand · for 
reconsideration. -- -
I 
In July, 1980, respondent Jan Hannah purchased a building 
at 201 Featherston Street in the city of Cleburne, Texas, 
with the intention of leasing it to Cleburne Living Centers, 
Inc. (CLC), 1 for the operation of a group home for the men-
tally retarded. It was anticipated that the home would 
house thirteen retarded men and women, who would be 
under the constant supervision of CLC staff members. The 
1 Cleburne Living Centers, Inc., is now known as Community Living 
Concepts, Inc. Hannah is the Vice-President and part owner of CLC. 
For convenience, both Hannah and CLC will be referred to as "CLC." A 
third respondent is Advocacy, Inc. , a non-profit corporation that provides 
legal services to developmentally disabled persons. 
.. 
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house had four bedrooms and two baths, with a half bath to 
be added. CLC planned to comply with all applicable state 
and federal regulations. 2 · 
The city informed CLC that a special use permit would be 
required for the operation of a group home at the site, and 
CLC accordingly submitted a permit application. In re-
sponse to a subsequent inquiry from CLC, the city explained 
that under the zoning regulations applicable to the site, a spe-
cial use permit, renewable annually, was required for the 
construction of "[h]ospitals for the insane or feeble-minded, 
or alcoholic [sic] or drug addicts, or penal or correctional in-
stitutions." 3 The .city had determined that the proposed 
2 It was anticipated that the home would be operated as a private Level 
I Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded, or ICF-MR, 
under a program providing for joint federal-State reimbursement for resi-
dential services for mentally retarded clients. See 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1396d(a)(15); Tex. Hum. Res. Code § 32.001 et seq. ICF-MR's are cov-
ered by extensive regulations and guidelines established by the United 
States Department of Health and Human Services and the Texas Depart-
ments of Human Resources, Mental Health and Mental Retardation, and 
Health. See App. 92. See also 42 CFR § 442 et seq.; 25 Tex. Adm. Code, 
Title 40, § 27 et seq. 
3 The site of the home is in an are-a zoned "R-3," an "Apartment House 
District." App. 51. Section 8 of the Cleburne zoning ordinance, in perti-
nent part, allows the following uses in an R-3 district: 
1. Any use permitted in District R-2. 
2. Apartment houses, or multiple dwellings. 
3. Boarding and lodging houses. 
4. Fraternity or sorority houses and dormitories. 
5. Apartment hotels. 
6. Hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes or homes for convalescents or 
aged, other than for the insane or feeble-minded or alcoholics or drug 
addicts. - ----. -
7. ~ivate clubs or fraternal orders, except those whose chief activity is 
carried on as a business. 
8. Philanthropic or eleemosynary institutions, other than penal 
institutions. 
9. Accessory uses customarily incident to any of the above uses 
App. 60-61 (emphasis added). 
" 
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group home should be classified as a "hospital for the feeble-
minded." After holding a public hearing on CLC's applica-
tion, the city council voted three to one to deny a special use 
permit. 4 
CLC then filed suit in Federal District Court against the 
city and a number of its officials, alleging, inter alia, that the 
zoning ordinance was invalid on its face and as applied be-
cause it discriminated against the mentally retarded in viola-
tion of the equal protection rights of CLC and its potential 
residents. The District Court found that "[i]f the potential 
residents of the Featherston Street home were not mentally 
retarded, but the home was the same in all other respects, its 
use would be permitted under the city's zoning ordinance," 
and that the city council's decision "was motivated primarily 
by the fact that the residents of the home would be persons 
who are mentally retarded." App. at 93, 94. Even so, the 
v District Court held the ordinance and its application constitu-
tional. Concluding that no fundamental right was implicated 
and that mental retardation was neither a suspect nor a 
quasi-suspect classification, the court employed the minimum 
level of judicial scrutiny applicable to equal protection claims. 
The court deemed the ordinahce, as written and applied, to 
be rationally related to the City's legitimate interests in "the 
legal responsibility of CLC and its residents, ... the safety 
and fears of residents in the adjoining neighborhood," and the 
Section 16 of the ordinance specifies the uses for which a special use per-
mit may be issued. These include "[h]ospitals for the insane or feeble-
minded, or alcoholic or drug addicts, or penal or correctional institutions." 
App. 63. Section 16 provides that a permit for such a use may be issued by 
"the Governing Body, after public hearing, and after recommendation of 
the Planning Commission." All special use permits are limited to one 
year, and each applicant is required "to obtain the signatures of the prop-
erty owners within two hundred (200) feet of the property to be used." 
!d. 
• The City's Planning and Zoning Commission had earlier held a hearing 
and voted to deny the permit. App. 91. 
84-468-0PINION 
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number of people to be housed in the home. 5 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, deter-
mining that mental retardation was a quasi-suspect classifica-
tion and that it should assess the validity of the ordinance 
under intermediate-level scrutiny. 726 F. 2d 191 (1984). 
Because mental retardation was in fact relevant to many leg-
islative actions, strict scrutiny was not appropriate. But in 
light of the history of "unfair and often grotesque mistreat-
ment" of the retarded, discrimination against them was 
"likely to reflect deep-seated prejudice." I d., at 197. In ad-
dition, the mentally retarded lacked political power, and their 
condition was immutable. The court considered heightened 
scrutiny to be particularly appropriate in this case, because 
the City's ordinance withheld a benefit which, although not 
fundamental, was very important to the mentally retarded. 
Without group homes, the court stated, the retarded could 
never hope to integrate themselves into the community. 6 
Applying the test that it considered appropriate, the court 
held that the ordinance was invalid on its face because it did 
not substantially further any important governmental inter-
ests. The Court of Appeals went on to hold that the· ordi-
nance was also invalid as applied. 7 We granted certiorari, --- -- .., 
5 The District Court also rejected,CLC's other claims, including the ar-
gument that the City had violated due process by improperly delegating its 
zoning powers to the owners of adjoining property. Cf. State of Washing-
ton ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U. S. 116 (1928). App. 
105. The Court of Appeals did not address this argument, and it has not 
been raised by the parties in this Court. 
6 The District Court had found that 
"[g]roup homes currently are the principal community living alternatives 
for persons who are mentally retarded. The availability of such a home in 
communities is an essential ingredient of normal living patterns for persons 
who are mentally retarded, and each factor that makes such group homes 
harder to establish operates to exclude persons who are mentally retarded 
from the community." App. 94. 
7 The City relied on a recently passed State regulation limiting group 
homes to six residents in support of its argument that the CLC home would 
be overcrowded with thirteen. But, the Court of Appeals observed, the 
84-468--0PINION 
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-u.s.- (1984). 8 
II 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment commands that no state shall "deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," which 
is essentially a direction~t all persons similarly situated 
should be treated alike. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202, 216 
(1982). Section 5 of the Amendment empowers Congress to 
enforce this mandate, but absent controlling Congressional 
direction, the Courts have themselves devised standards for 
City had failed to justify its apparent view that any other group of thirteen 
people could live under these allegedly "crowded" conditions, nor had it ex-
plained why six would be acceptable but thirteen not. 
CLC concedes that it could not qualify for certification under the new 
Texas regulation. Tr. Oral Arg. 31 (April 23, 1985). The Court of Ap-
peals stated that the new regulation applied only to applications made after 
May 1, 1982, and therefore did not apply to the CLC home. 726 F. 2d, at 
202. The regulation itself contains no grandfather clause, see App. 78-81, 
and the District Court made no specific finding. on this point. See App. 96. 
However, the State has asserted in an amicus brief filed in this Court that 
"'the six bed rule' would not pose an obstacle to the proposed Featherston 
Street group home at issue in this case." Brief for the State of Texas and 
the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation as Amici 
Curiae 15, n. 7. If the six-bed requirement were to apply to the home, 
there is a serious possibility that CLC would no longer be interested in in-
junctive relief. David Southern, an officer of CLC, testifed that "to break 
even on a facility of this type, you have to have at least ten or eleven resi-
dents." App. 32. However, because CLC requested damages as well as 
an injunction, see App. 15, the case would not be moot. 
8 Macon Association for Retarded Citizens v. Macon-Bibb County 
Planning and Zoning Commisssion, 314 S. E. 2d 218 (Ga.), dismissed for 
want of a substantial federal question,-- U. S. -- (1984), has no con-
trolling effect on this case. Macon Association for Retarded Citizens in-
volved an ordinance that had the effect of excluding a group home for the 
retarded only because it restricted dwelling units to those occupied by a 
single family, defined as no more than four unrelated persons. In Village 
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), we upheld the constitutionality 
of a similar ordinance, and the Georgia Supreme Court in M aeon Associa-
tion specifically held that the ordinance did not discriminate against the re-
tarded. 314 S. E. 2d, at 221. 
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determining the validity of state legislation or other offical 
action that is challenged as denying equal protection. The 
general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and 
will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is 
rationally related to aletimate stateiirterest. SchweiTCer 
v. Wi son, 450 U. S. 221, 230 (198 ; me tates Railroad 
Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 174-175 (1980); 
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93, 97 (1979); New Orleans v. 
Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 303 (1976). When social or economic 
legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the 
states wide latitude, United States Railroad Retirement 
Board v. Fritz, supra, at 174 (1980); New Orleans v. Dukes, 
supra, at 303, and the Constitution presumes that even im-
provident decisions will eventually be rectified by the demo-
cratic processes. 
The general rule gives way, however, when a statute clas-
sifies by race, alienage or n.ational origin. These factors are 
so seldom relevant To the achi~ement of any legitimate state 
interest that laws grounded in such considerations are 
deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy-a view that those 
in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as oth-
ers. For these reasons and ,because such discrimination is 
unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means, these laws 
are subjected to strict scru...!.!Ey and will be sustained OElY if 
they are ffiiifa6ly tailored to a serve a compelling state 
intersts. McLaug'7rliri:V:Florta a, 379 U. S. 184, 192 (1964); 
Granam v. Richardson, 403 U. S. ?65 (1971). Similar over-
sight by the courts is due when state laws impinge on per-
sonal rights protected by the Constitution. Kramer v. 
Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U. S. 621 (1969); 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969); Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 U. S. 535 (1942). 
Legislative classifications based on gender also call for 
somewhat heightened standards of review. That factor gen-
erally provides no sensible ground for differential treatment. 
"[W]hat differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as 
''* • l, , f 
~~ 
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intelligence or physical disability . . . is that the sex charac-
teristic frequently bears no relationship to ability to perform 
or contribute to society." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 
U. S. 677, 686 (1973)(plurality opinion). Rather than resting 
on meaningful considerations, statutes distributing benefits 
and burdens between the sexes in different ways very likely 
reflect outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men 
and women. Strict scrutin is not a propriate in such 
cases, but the law a1 s un ess it is substantially related to a 
Sufficiently important governmental interest. Mississippi 
University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig 
v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190 (1971). Because illegitimacy is be-
yond the individual's control and bears "no relation to the in-
dividual's ability to participate in and contribute to society," 
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 505 (1976), official discrimi-
nations resting on that characteristic are also subject to 
somewhat heightened review. Those restrictions "will sur-
vive equal protection scrutiny to the extent that they are 
substantially related to a legitimate state interest." Mills v. 
Habluetzel, 456 U. S. 91, 99 (1982). 
We have declined, however, to extend heightened review 
to differential treatment based on age: 
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not 
been wholly free of discrimination, such persons, unlike, 
say, those who have been discriminated against on the 
basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a 
"history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been sub-
jected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped 
characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities. ~<--
The lesson o~---u;;--;s that where individuals in the group 
affected by a l stinguishing characteristics relevant 
to interests the state has the authority to implement, the 
courts have been very reluctant, as they should be in our fed-
eral system and with our respect for the separation of pow-
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how and to ·what extent those interests should be pursued. 
In such cases, the Equal Protection Clause requires only a ra-
tional means to serve a legitimate end. 
III 
Against this background, we conclude for several reasons 
that the Court of Appeals erred in holding mentally retarded 
individuals a quasi-suspect classification calling for a more ex-
acting standard of judicial review than is normally accorded 
economic and social legislation. First, it is undeniable, and 
it is not argued otherwise here, that those who are mentally 
retarded have a reduced ability to cope with and function in 
the everyday world. Nor are they all cut from the same pat-
tern: as the testimony in this record indicates, they range 
from those whose disability is not immediately evident to 
those who must be constantly cared for. 9 They are thus dif-
ferent, immutably so, in relevant respects, and the states' in-
terest in dealing with and providing for them is plainly a 
• 
9 Mentally retarded i~dividuals fall into four distinct categories. The 
vast majority-approximately 89o/o-are classified as "mildly'' retarded, 
meaning that their IQ is between 50 and 70. Approximately 6% percent 
are "moderately" retarded, with IQs between 35 and 50. The remaining 
two categories are "severe" (IQs of 20 to 35) and "profound" (IQs below 
20). These last two categories together account for about 5% of the men-
tally retarded population. App. 39 (Testimony of Dr. Philip Roos). 
Mental retardation is not defined by reference to intelligence or IQ 
alone, however. The American Association on Mental Deficiency (AAMD) 
has defined mental retardation as "significantly subaverage general intel-
lectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior 
and manifested during the developmental period." Brief for AAMD et a!. 
as Amici Curiae 3 (quoting AAMD, Classification in Mental Retardation 1 
(H. Grossman ed. 1983)). "Deficits in adaptive behavior" are limitations 
on general ability to meet the standards of maturation, learning, personal 
independence, and social responsibility expected for an individual's age 
level and cultural group. Id., at 4, n. 1. Mental retardation is caused by 
a variety of factors, some genetic, some environmental, and some un-
known. Id., at 4. 
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legitmate one. 10 How this large and diversified group is to 
be treated under the law is a difficult and often a technical 
matter, very much a task for legislators guided by qualified 
professionals and not by the perhaps ill-informed opinions of 
the judiciary. Heightened scrutiny inevitably involves sub-
stantive judgments about legislative decisions, and we doubt 
that the predicate for such judicial oversight is present where 
the classification deals with mental retardation. 
Second, the distinctive legislative response, both national 
and state, to the plight of those who are mentally retarded 
demonstrates not only that they have unique problems, but 
also that the lawmakers have been addressing their difficul-
ties in a manner that belies a continuing antipathy or preju-
dice and a corresponding need for more intrusive oversight 
by the judiciary. Thus, the federal government has not only I 
outlawed discrimination against the mentally retarded in fed-
erally funded programs, see Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973, 29 U. S. C. § 794, but it has also provided the 
retarded with the right to receive "appropriate treatment, 
services, and habilitation" in a setting that is "least restric-
tive of [their] personal liberty." Developmental Disabilities 
and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 6010(1), (2). In addi-
tion, the government has conditioned federal education funds 
on a State's assurance that retarded children will enjoy an 
education that, "to the maximum extent appropriate," is inte-
grated with that of non-mentally retarded children. Educa-
10 As Dean Ely has observed: 
"Surely one has to feel sorry for a person disabled by something he or she 
can't do anything about, but I'm not aware of any reason to suppose that 
elected officials are unusually unlikely to share that feeling. Moreover, 
classifications based on physical disability and intelligence are typically ac-
cepted as legitimate, even by judges and commentators who assert that im-
mutability is relevant. The explanation, when one is given, is that those 
characteristics (unlike the one the commentator is trying to render sus-
pect) are often relevant to legitimate purposes. At that point there's not 
much left of the immutability theory, is there?" J. Ely, Democracy and 
Distrust 150 (1980) (footnote omitted). See also id., at 154-155. 
84-4~0PINION 
10 CLEBURNE v. CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER 
tion of the Handicapped Act, 20 U. S. C. § 1412(5)(B). The 
government has also facilitated the hiring of the mentally re-
tarded into the federal civil service by exempting them from 
the requirement of competitive examination. See 5 CFR 
§ 213-3102(t) (1984). The State of Texas has similarly en-
acted legislation that acknowledges the special status of the 
mentally retarded by conferring certain rights upon them, 
such as "the right to live in the least restrictive setting appro-
priate to [their] individual needs and abilities," including "the 
right to live ... in a group home." Mentally Retarded Per-
sons Act of 1977, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5547-300, 
§ 7.11 
Such legislation thus singling out the retarded for special 
treatment reflects the real and undeniable differences be-
tween the retarded and others. That a civilized and decent 
society expects and approves such legislation indicates that 
governmental consideration of those differences in the vast 
majority of situations is not only legitimate but desirable. It 
may be, as CLC contends, that legislation designed to bene-
fit, rather than disadvantage, the retarded would generally 
withstand examination under a test of heightened scrutiny. 
See Brief for Respondents 38-41. The relevant inquiry, 
however, is whether heightened scrutiny is constitutionally 
mandated in the first instance. Even assuming that many of 
these laws could be shown to be substantially related to an 
important governmental purpose, merely requiring the legis-
lature to justify its efforts in these terms may lead it to re-
frain from acting at all. Much recent legislation intended to 
benefit the retarded also assumes the need for measures that 
11 CLC originally sought relief under the Act, but voluntarily dismissed 
this pendent state claim when the District Court indicated that its presence 
might make abstention appropriate. The Act had never been construed 
by the Texas courts. App. 12, 14, 84-87. 
A number of states have passed legislation prohibiting zoning that ex-
cludes the retarded. See, e. g., Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 1566 et seq.; 
Conn. Gen Stat. § 8-3e; N. D. C. C. § 25-16-14(2); R. I. Gen. Laws. Tit. 
45, ch. 24 § 22. See also Md. Ann. Code, Health-General Article, § 7-102. 
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might be perceived to disadvantage them. The Education of 
the Handicapped Act, for example, requires an "appropriate" 
education, not one that is equal in all respects to the educa-
tion of non-retarded children; clearly, admission to a class 
that exceeded the abilities of a retarded child would not be 
appropriate. 12 Similarly, the Developmental Disabilities Act 
and the Texas act give the retarded the right to live only in 
the "least restrictive setting" appropriate to their abilities, 
implicitly assuming the need for at least some restrictions 
that would not be imposed on others. 13 Especially given the 
wide variation in the abilities and needs of the retarded them-
selves, governmental bodies must have a certain amount of 
flexibility and freedom from judicial oversight in shaping and 
limiting their remedial efforts. 
Third, the legislative response, which could hardly have oc-
curred and survived without public support, negates any 
claim that the mentally r~tarded are politically powerless in 
the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of 
the lawmakers. Any minority can be said to be powerless to 
assert direct control over the legislature, but if that were a 
criterion for higher level scrutiny by the courts, much eco-
nomic and social iegislation would now be suspect. 
Fourth, if the lar e and amor hous class of the mentally 
retarded were deemed quasi--suspect for the reasons given by 
the Court o ppea s, 1t wou d e 1fficult to find a principled 
way to distinggish a var1et of otner groups wno have per-
haps immuta e d1sa ilities set mg em o om others, who 
cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative responses, 
and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part 
l2 The Act, which specifically included the mentally retarded in its defini-
tion of handicapped, see 20 U. S. C. § 1401(1), also recognizes the great 
variations within the classification of retarded children. The Act requires 
that school authorities devise an "individualized eduational program," id., 
at § 1401(19), that is "tailored to the unique needs of the handicapped 
child." Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U. S. 176, 181 (1982). 
13 The Developmental Disabilities Act also prohibits the use of physical 
restraint "unless absolutely necessary." 42 U. S. C. § 6010(2) . 
. , 
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of t~e ublic at.~ One need me tion in this res ect only 
the agin the , the entail 11, and th mfirm We 
are re uctant to set out on that course, and we decline to do 
so. 
Doubtless, there have been and there will continue to be 
instances of discrimination against the retarded that are in 
fact invidious, and that are proP,erly subject to judicial cor-
rection under constitutional norms. But the appropriate 
method of reaching such instances is not to create a new 
quasi-suspect classification and subject all governmental ac-
tion based on that classification to more searching evaluation. 
Rather, we should look to the likelihood that governmental 
action premised on a particular classification is valid as a gen-
eral matter, not merely to the specifics of the case before us. 
Because mental retardation is a characteristic that the gov-
ernment may legitimately take into account in a wide range 
of decisions, and because both state and federal governments 
have recently committed themselves to assisting the re-
tarded, we will not presume that any given legislative action, 
even one that disadvantages retarded individuals, is rooted in 
considerations that the Constitution will not tolerate. 
'IV 
Our refusal to recognize the retarded as a quasi-suspect 
class does not leave them entirely unprotected from invidious 
discrimination. To withstand equal protection review, legis-
lation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded and 
others mu~t be ~nal!x 1.~ted to a legitimate govern-
mental purpose. n1s standard, we believe, affords govern-
ment the latitude necessary both to pursue policies designed 
to assist the retarded in realizing their full potential, 'and to 
freely and efficiently engage in activities that burden the re-
tarded in what is essentially an incidental manner. The 
State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an 
asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction ar-
bitrary or irrational. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U. S. 55, 
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61-63; United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 
413 U. S. 528, 535 (1973). Furthermore, some objectives-
such as "a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group," Moreno, 413 U. S., at 534-are not legitimate state 
interests. See also Zabel, supra, 457 U. S., at 63. Beyond 
that, the mentally retarded, like others, have and retain their 
substantive constitutional rights in addition to the right to be 
treated equally by the law. Our decision today in no way af-
fects those rights. 
The Court of Appeals, having settled on an intermediate 
level of scrutiny, did not attempt to assess the validity of the 
City's actions under the rational relationship standard. The 
application of the proper test is a task that we leave to the 
Court of Appeals in the first instance, particularly because 
the question is one "clouded by an ambiguity in state law." 14 
·· G. D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn, 455 U. S. 404, 413 (1982). Cf. 
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 345-346 (1976); Gooding v. 
Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 524, and n. 2 (1972). 
The case is accordingly reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
1
' The State of Texas and the State Deparment of Mental Health and 
Mental Retardation (TDMHMR) have submitted a brief as amici curiae in 
this Court, arguing that the city's denial of a special use permit runs 
counter to the State's policy favoring the establishment of group homes for 
the mentally retarded. See Mentally Retarded Persons Act of 1977, Tex. 
Rev. Civ. art. 5547-300. Furthermore, the State asserts that the city 
may not legitimately use its zoning powers to further the welfare of the 
retarded themselves, as distinguished from the welfare of the surrounding 
community. The State contends that judgments as to the ability of the 
retarded to live in a group home in a residential neighborhood lie within the 
exclusive province of the appropriate State agencies, and are not included 
within the purposes that have been delegated to the city as valid objectives 
of municipal zoning legislation. Brief for the State of Texas and the 
TDMHMR as Amici Curiae 13-14. The State did not raise these argu-
ments below, Tr. of Oral Arg. 30 (March 18, 1985), and we decline to ad-
dress them or assess their significance. 
aml 
1: ~.o\" 
6~~ it To: 
t\ ~ From: 
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1 read Justice White's opinion in this case. Although 1 am 
sympathetic to the view that the mentally retarded should be 
treated as a quasi-suspect class, 1 think the opinion does a good 
job of explaining why the Court will not accord the class such 
status. The opinion is in accord with your position on this 
issue. 
1 am troubled, however, by the opinion's decision to remand 
the case. 1 don't think the opinion offers a satisfactory 
justification for this disposition. On the very last page, the 
opinion notes that the CA "did not attempt to assess the validity 
of the City's actions under the rational relationship standard." 
Justice White asserts that this legal question should be left to 
the CA "in the first instance, particularly because the question 
is one clouded by an ambiguity in state law." 1n a footnote he 
explains that the Court will not address the arguments raised in 
an amicus brief by the State of Texas concerning state law 
because the State did not raise them below. 1 have several 
problems with this approach. 
First, there are two different questions to be addressed 
once the Court decides that the rational basis test is 
appropriate: (1) the facial validity of the City's ordinance; (2) 
the validity of the ordinance as applied. While I can see why 
the Court might want to let the CA have the first look at whether 
the ordinance is rational as applied, I don't see a good reason 
for doing so with respect to the facial chalLenge. The facial 
cha leng ere an invo ves a stra1 htforward legal 
question. has never offered an basis, rational or 
ot~se, for · rd'nance draws. It has 
never sought o justify, for example, its treating alcohoics, 
drug addicts, and the mentally retarded alike, and differently 
from the other classes in the ordinance. The facial problems 
with the ordinance exist quite apart from any question of state 
law. 
Second, Justice White's opinion states that it will not 
address the state law question because the State did not make 
this argument below. If the State did not make the argument 
below, why should the CA address it on remand? And if the CA 
isn't going to address it on remand, why the remand? 
As I understand your position at Conference, yoJf thought 
that the case should either be decided here ·~ 
vall st on or remanded. From talking to Justice 
Marshal!'s c erk, I understand that he plans to circulate an 
opinion holding the ordinance invalid on 3 different rationales 
-- quasi-suspect class, facial rational basis, as applied. The 
opinion is supposed to be written to allow individual Justices to 
join only one rationale. In light of the problems with the 
remand, I recommend that you wait for Justice Marshall's opinion. 
1Justice Marshall was assigned to write the dissent in 
this case, but his o~~~on could become the opinion of the Court. 
Apparently, Justice ~~ens is planning to circulate a memo 
stating that he will join an opinion holding the ordinance 
facially invalid. Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun 
accept this position as a minimum. If you joined this view, it 




TO: Annmarie DATE: June 3, 1985 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
84-468 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center 
As you will see from the draft of my letter to 
Justice White, I agree that there is no reason why this 
Court should not decide the facial issue. Nevertheless, my 
guess is that BRW will get a Court for his opinion remanding 
the entire case to the Court of Appeals. 
As time is running out in this Term, and as you 
are not too pressed, I suggest that you prepare a brief 
opinion concurring and dissenting. We may well hear from 
BRW rather promptly. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
~nprmu Oflturl af firt~b !'tatts 
Jlu~ ~. ar. 2llc?~~ 
CHAMI!SERS 01" 
.JUSTICE w .. . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
June 3, 1985 
No. 84-468 
City of Cleburne 
v. Cleburne Living Center 
Dear Byron, 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~u.prttnt <!f01Ui gf tlrt ~t~ ,jbdt&" 
jiufring~ J. <If. 2ll~'l~ / 
June 3, 1985 
Re: No. 84-468 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center 
Dear Byron, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
lfp/ss 06/03/85 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Annmarie DATE: June 3, 1985 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
84-468 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center. 
As you will see from the draft of mv letter to 
Justice White, I agree that there is no reason '"hy this 
Court should not necide the facial issue. Nevertheless, my 
quess is that B~l will get a Court for his o~inion remanding 
the entire case to the Court of Appeals. 
As time is running out in this Term, and as vou 
are not too oressed, I suggest t~at you PrePare a brief 
opin:f.on concurring and dissenting. We may well hear from 
BRW rather oromptlv. 
I-. F. P., Jr. 
ss 
To: Justice Powell 
From: Annmarie 
Re: No. 84-468, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center 
I read your letter to Justice White explaining why you think 
the Court should rule that the ordinance at issue is facially 
invalid. I think this is the right result, and that the letter 
makes a persuasive case for it. 
If there are five votes for holding the ordinance facially 
invalid, and I think there will be, then there is no need to 
reach the question whet er the mental~~~ded ar~1a quasi-suspect class. ust1ce hite's op1 10n is devoted a md st 
en~ discussing why heightened scrutiny is not the 
appropriate test. This discussion addresses the reasoning of the 
CA, but it is unnecessary to the decision that the ordinance is 
facially invalid. Thus, I'm not sure that you would want to join 
any part of Justice White's opinion as it now stands. 
Your letter doesn't say that you'll join Justice White's 
opinion if he simply adds a section on facial invalidity, but it 
could be interpreted that way. If you agree that the Court need 
not reach the quasi-s~pe£t_Q lass~uestion, then you might want 
to condition your w1Til ngness t o join Justice White's opinion 
eeRtiR~~~on his changing entirely the focus of the draft. I 
understand why you may not want to do that, · but this approach 
1 ec ing unnecessarily a constitutional question. 
Steve circulated a memo today that seems to take the 
--~~~~ 
I will be happy to draft a short opinion in case you want 
to write separately. r ~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.-upunu ar"m "f tlrt ~ttb .;ltatt• 
·-Jrittllhtn. ~. ar. 21lc?'!~ 
June 3, 1985 
Re: 84-468 - City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center 
Dear Byron: 
Although I agree that there was no need for the 
Court of Appeals to apply the "somewhat heightened" 
standard of review in order to reach the conclusion 
that discrimination against the mentally retarded 
evidenced by this record was unconstitutional, I 
continue to believe that the Court should decide the 
merits of the case and affirm the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. 
In all events, I shall await further writing and 
perhaps add a few words of my own. 
Respectfully, 
Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
7 
- pp. 6 ' 7 & stylistic changes 
2nd DRAFT 




Justice Powell ~ 
Justice Rehnquist 1ft 
Justice Stevens 
Justice O'Connor 
From: Justice White 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated:JI=IIt:..::...._4 _ ~----
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-468 
CITY OF CLEBURNE, TEXAS, ET AL., PETITIONERS 
v. CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1985] 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
A Texas city denied a special use permit for the operation 
of a group home for the mentally retarded, acting pursuant to 
a municipal zoning ordinance requiring permits for such 
homes. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that 
mental retardation is a "quasi-suspect" classification and that 
the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause because it 
did not substantially further an important governmental 
purpose. Because we conclude that a lesser standard of 
scrutiny is appropriate, we reverse and remand for 
reconsideration. 
I 
In July, 1980, respondent Jan Hannah purchased a building 
at 201 Featherston Street in the city of Cleburne, Texas, 
with the intention of leasing it to Cleburne Living Centers, 
Inc. (CLC), I for the operation of a group home for the men-
tally retarded. It was anticipated that the home would 
house 13 retarded men and women, who would be under the 
constant supervision of CLC staff members. The house had 
1 Cleburne Living Centers, Inc., is now known as Community Living 
Concepts, Inc. Hannah is the Vice-President and part owner of CLC. 
For convenience, both Hannah and CLC will be referred to as "CLC." A 
third respondent is Advocacy, Inc., a non-profit corporation that provides 
legal services to developmentally disabled persons. 
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four bedrooms and two baths, with a half bath to be added. 
CLC planned to comply with all applicable state and federal 
regulations. 2 
The city informed CLC that a special use permit would be 
required for the operation of a group home at the site, and 
CLC accordingly submitted a permit application. In re-
sponse to a subsequent inquiry from CLC, the city explained 
that under the zoning regulations applicable to the site, a spe-
cial use permit, renewable annually, was required for the 
construction of "[h]ospitals for the insane or feeble-minded, 
or alcoholic [sic] or drug addicts, or penal or correctional in-
stitutions." 3 The city had determined that the proposed 
2 It was anticipated that the home would be operated as a private Level 
I Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded, or ICF -MR, 
under a program providing for joint federal-State reimbursement for resi-
dential services for mentally retarded clients. See 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1396d(a)(15); Tex. Hum. Res. Code § 32.001 et seq. ICF-MR's are cov-
ered by extensive regulations and guidelines established by the United 
States Department of Health and Human Services and the Texas Depart-
ments of Human Resources, Mental Health and Mental Retardation, and 
Health. See App. 92. See also 42 CFR § 442 et seq.; 25 Tex. Adm. Code, 
Title 40, § 27 et seq. 
8 The site of the home is in an area zoned "R-3," an "Apartment House 
District." App. 51. Section 8 of the Cleburne zoning ordinance, in perti-
nent part, allows the following uses in an R-3 district: 
1. Any use permitted in District R-2. 
2. Apartment houses, or multiple dwellings. 
3. Boarding and lodging houses. 
4. Fraternity or sorority houses and dormitories. 
5. Apartment hotels. 
6. Hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes or homes for convalescents or 
aged, other than for the insane or feeble-minded or alcoholics or drug 
addicts. 
7. Private clubs or fraternal orders, except those whose chief activity is 
carried on as a business. 
8. Philanthropic or eleemosynary institutions, other than penal 
institutions. 
9. Accessory uses customarily incident to any of the above uses ... " 
App. 60-61 (emphasis added). 
84-468-0PINION 
CLEBURNE v. CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER 3 
group home should be classified as a "hospital for the feeble-
minded." After holding a public hearing on CLC's applica-
tion, the city council voted three to one to deny a special use 
permit. 4 
CLC then filed suit in Federal District Court against the 
city and a number of its officials, alleging, inter alia, that the 
zoning ordinance was invalid on its face and as applied be-
cause it discriminated against the mentally retarded in viola-
tion of the equal protection rights of CLC and its potential 
residents. The District Court found that "[i]f the potential 
residents of the Featherston Street home were not mentally 
retarded, but the home was the same in all other respects, its 
use would be permitted under the city's zoning ordinance," 
and that the city council's decision "was motivated primarily 
by the fact that the residents of the home would be persons 
who are mentally retarded." App. at 93, 94. Even so, the 
District Court held the ordinance and its application constitu-
tional. Concluding that no fundamental right was implicated 
and that mental retardation was neither a suspect nor a 
quasi-suspect classification, the court employed the minimum 
level of judicial scrutiny applicable to equal protection claims. 
The court deemed the ordinance, as written and applied, to 
be rationally related to the City's legitimate interests in "the 
legal responsibility of CLC and its residents, ... the safety 
and fears of residents in the adjoining neighborhood," and the 
Section 16 of the ordinance specifies the uses for which a special use per-
mit may be issued. These include "[h]ospitals for the insane or feeble-
minded, or alcoholic or drug addicts, or penal or correctional institutions." 
App. 63. Section 16 provides that a permit for such a use may be issued by 
"the Governing Body, after public hearing, and after recommendation of 
the Planning Commission." All special use permits are limited to one 
year, and each applicant is required "to obtain the signatures of the prop-
erty owners within two hundred (200) feet of the property to be used." 
Ibid. 
• The City's Planning and Zoning Commission had earlier held a hearing 
and voted to deny the permit. App. 91. 
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number of people to be housed in the home. 5 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, deter-
mining that mental retardation was a quasi-suspect classifica-
tion and that it should assess the validity of the ordinance 
under intermediate-level scrutiny. 726 F. 2d 191 (1984). 
Because mental retardation was in fact relevant to many leg-
islative actions, strict scrutiny was not appropriate. But in 
light of the history of "unfair and often grotesque mistreat-
ment" of the retarded, discrimination against them was 
"likely to reflect deep-seated prejudice." !d., at 197. In ad-
dition, the mentally retarded lacked political power, and their 
condition was immutable. The court considered heightened 
scrutiny to be particularly appropriate in this case, because 
the City's ordinance withheld a benefit which, although not 
fundamental, was very important to the mentally retarded. 
Without group homes, the court stated, the retarded could 
never hope to integrate themselves into the community. 6 
Applying the test that it considered appropriate, the court 
held that the ordinance was invalid on its face because it did 
not substantially further any important governmental inter-
ests. The Court of Appeals went on to hold that the ordi-
nance was also invalid as applied. 7 We granted certiorari, 
&The District Court also rejected CLC's other claims, including the ar-
gument that the City had violated due process by improperly delegating its 
zoning powers to the owners of adjoining property. Cf. State of Washing-
ton ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U. S. 116 (1928). App. 
105. The Court of Appeals did not address this argument, and it has not 
been raised by the parties in this Court. 
6 The District Court had found that 
"[g]roup homes currently are the principal community living alternatives 
for persons who are mentally retarded. The availability of such a home in 
communities is an essential ingredient of normal living patterns for persons 
who are mentally retarded, and each factor that makes such group homes 
harder to establish operates to exclude persons who are mentally retarded 
from the community." App. 94. 
7 The City relied on a recently passed State regulation limiting group 
homes to six residents in support of its argument that the CLC home would 
be overcrowded with thirteen. But, the Court of Appeals observed, the 
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-u.s.- (1984). 8 
II 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment commands that no state shall "deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," which 
is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated 
should be treated alike. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202, 216 
(1982). Section 5 of the Amendment empowers Congress to 
enforce this mandate, but absent controlling Congressional 
direction, the Courts have themselves devised standards for 
City had failed to justify its apparent view that any other group of thirteen 
people could live under these allegedly "crowded" conditions, nor had it ex-
plained why six would be acceptable but thirteen not. 
CLC concedes that it could not qualify for certification under the new 
Texas regulation. Tr. Oral Arg. 31 (April 23, 1985). The Court of Ap-
peals stated that the new regulation applied only to applications made after 
May 1, 1982, and therefore did not apply to the CLC home. 726 F. 2d, at 
202. The regulation itself contains no grandfather clause, see App. 78-81, 
and the District Court made no specific finding on this point. See App. 96. 
However, the State has asserted in an amicus brief filed in this Court that 
" 'the six bed rule' would not pose an obstacle to the proposed Featherston 
Street group home at issue in this case." Brief for the State of Texas and 
the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation as Amici 
Curiae 15, n. 7. If the six-bed requirement were to apply to the home, 
there is a serious possibility that cr..c would no longer be interested in in-
junctive relief. David Southern, an officer of CLC, testifed that "to break 
even on a facility of this type, you have to have at least ten or eleven resi-
dents." App. 32. However, because CLC requested damages as well as 
an injunction, see App. 15, the case would not be moot. 
8 Macon Association for Retarded Citizens v. Macon-Bibb County 
Planning and Zoning Commisssion, 314 S. E. 2d 218 (Ga.), dismissed for 
want of a substantial federal question,-- U. S. -- (1984), has no con-
trolling effect on this case. Macon Association for Retarded Citizens in-
volved an ordinance that had the effect of excluding a group home for the 
retarded only because it restricted dwelling units to those occupied by a 
single family, defined as no more than four unrelated persons. In Village 
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1 (1974), we upheld the constitutionality 
of a similar ordinance, and the Georgia Supreme Court in Macon Associa-
tion specifically held that the ordinance did not discriminate against the re-
tarded. 314 S. E. 2d, at 221. 
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determining the validity of state legislation or other offical 
action that is challenged as denying equal protection. The 
general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and 
will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Schweiker 
v. Wilson, 450 U. S. 221, 230 (1981); United States Railroad 
Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 174-175 (1980); 
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93, 97 (1979); New Orleans v. 
Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 303 (1976). When social or economic 
legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the 
states wide latitude, United States Railroad Retirement 
Board v. Fritz, supra, at 174 (1980); New Orleans v. Dukes, 
supra, at 303, and the Constitution presumes that even im-
provident decisions will eventually be rectified by the demo-
cratic processes. 
The general rule gives way, however, when a statute clas-
sifies by race, alienage or national origin. These factors are 
so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state 
interest that laws grounded in such considerations are 
deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy-a view that those 
in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as oth-
ers. For these reasons and because such discrimination is 
unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means, these laws 
are subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if 
they are suitably tailored to a serve a compelling state 
intersts. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 192 (1964); 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971). Similar over-
sight by the courts is due when state laws impinge on per-
sonal rights protected by the Constitution. Kramer v. 
Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U. S. 621 (1969); 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969); Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 U. S. 535 (1942). 
Legislative classifications based on gender also call for a I 
heightened standard of review. That factor generally pro-
vides no sensible ground for differential treatment. "[W]hat 
differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelli-
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gence or physical disability . . . is that the sex characteristic 
frequently bears no relationship to ability to perform or con-
tribute to society." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677, 
686 (1973) (plurality opinion). Rather than resting on mean-
ingful considerations, statutes distributing benefits and bur-
dens between the sexes in different ways very likely reflect 
outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men and ( 
women. A gender classification fails unless it is substan-
tially related to a sufficiently important governmental inter-
est. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 
718 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190 (1971). Because 
illegitimacy is beyond the individual's control and bears "no 
relation to the individual's ability to participate in and con-
tribute to society," Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 505 
(1976), official discriminations resting on that characteristic 
are also subject to somewhat heightened review. Those re-
strictions "will survive equal protection scrutiny to the ex-
tent that they are substantially related to a legitimate state 
interest." Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U. S. 91, 99 (1982). 
We have declined, however, to extend heightened review 
to differential treatment based on age: 
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not 
been wholly free of discrimination, such persons, unlike, 
say, those who have been discriminated against on the 
basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a 
"history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been sub-
jected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped ' 
characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities. 
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 
u. s. 307, 313 (1976). 
The lesson of Murgia is that where individuals in the group 
affected by a law have distinguishing characteristics relevant 
to interests the state has the authority to implement, the 
courts have been very reluctant, as they should be in our fed-
eral system and with our respect for the separation of pow-
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ers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to whether, 
how and to what extent those interests should be pursued. 
In such cases, the Equal Protection Clause requires only a ra-
tional means to serve a legitimate end. 
III 
Against this background, we conclude for several reasons 
that the Court of Appeals erred in holding mentally retarded 
individuals a quasi-suspect classification calling for a more ex-
acting standard of judicial review than is normally accorded 
economic and social legislation. First, it is undeniable, and 
it is not argued otherwise here, that those who are mentally 
retarded have a reduced ability to cope with and function in 
the everyday world. Nor are they all cut from the same pat-
tern: as the testimony in this record indicates, they range 
from those whose disability is not immediately evident to 
those who must be constantly cared for. 9 They are thus dif-
ferent, immutably so, in relevant respects, and the states' in-
terest in dealing with and providing for them is plainly a 
9 Mentally retarded individuals fall into four distinct categories. The 
vast majority-approximately 89%-are classified as "mildly" retarded, 
meaning that their IQ is between 50 and 70. Approximately 6% percent 
are "moderately'' retarded, with IQs between 35 and 50. The remaining 
two categories are "severe" (IQs of 20 to 35) and "profound" (IQs below 
20). These last two categories together account for about 5% of the men-
tally retarded population. App. 39 (Testimony of Dr. Philip Roos). 
Mental retardation is not defined by reference to intelligence or IQ 
alone, however. The American Association on Mental Deficiency (AAMD) 
has defined mental retardation as "significantly subaverage general intel-
lectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior 
and manifested during the developmental period." Brief for AAMD et al. 
as Amici Curiae 3 (quoting AAMD, Classification in Mental Retardation 1 
(H. Grossman ed. 1983)). "Deficits in adaptive behavior" are limitations 
on general ability to meet the standards of maturation, learning, personal 
independence, and social responsibility expected for an individual's age 
level and cultural group. Id., at 4, n. 1. Mental retardation is caused by 
a variety of factors, some genetic, some environmental, and some un-
known. Id., at 4. 
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legitmate one. 10 How this large and diversified group is to 
be treated under the law is a difficult and often a technical 
matter, very much a task for legislators guided by qualified 
professionals and not by the perhaps ill-informed opinions of 
the judiciary. Heightened scrutiny inevitably involves sub-
stantive judgments about legislative decisions, and we doubt 
that the predicate for such judicial oversight is present where 
the classification deals with mental retardation. 
Second, the distinctive legislative response, both national 
and state, to the plight of those who are mentally retarded 
demonstrates not only that they have unique problems, but 
also that the lawmakers have been addressing their difficul-
ties in a manner that belies a continuing antipathy or preju-
dice and a corresponding need for more intrusive oversight 
by the judiciary. Thus, the federal government has not only 
outlawed discrimination against the mentally retarded in fed-
erally funded programs, see § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, 29 U. S. C. § 794, but it has also provided the retarded 
with the right to receive "appropriate treatment, services, 
and habilitation" in a setting that is "least restrictive of 
[their] personal liberty." Developmental Disabilities and 
Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 6010(1), (2). In addition, 
the government has conditioned federal education funds on a 
State's assurance that retarded children will enjoy an educa-
tion that, "to the maximum extent appropriate," is integrated 
with that of non-mentally retarded children. Education of 
10 As Dean Ely has observed: 
"Surely one has to feel sorry for a person disabled by something he or she 
can't do anything about, but I'm not aware of any reason to suppose that 
elected officials are unusually unlikely to share that feeling. Moreover, 
classifications based on physical disability and intelligence are typically ac-
cepted as legitimate, even by judges and commentators who assert that im-
mutability is relevant. The explanation, when one is given, is that those 
characteristics (unlike the one the commentator is trying to render sus-
pect) are often relevant to legitimate purposes. At that point there's not 
much left of the immutability theory, is there?" J. Ely, Democracy and 
Distrust 150 (1980) (footnote omitted). See also id., at 154-155. 
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the Handicapped Act, 20 U. S. C. § 1412(5)(B). The govern-
ment has also facilitated the hiring of the mentally retarded 
into the federal civil service by exempting them from the re-
quirement of competitive examination. See 5 CFR 
§ 213-3102(t) (1984). The State of Texas has similarly en-
acted legislation that acknowledges the special status of the 
mentally retarded by conferring certain rights upon them, 
such as "the right to live in the least restrictive setting appro-
priate to [their] individual needs and abilities," including "the 
right to live ... in a group home." Mentally Retarded Per-
sons Act of 1977, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5547-300, 
§ 7.11 
Such legislation thus singling out the retarded for special 
treatment reflects the real and undeniable differences be-
tween the retarded and others. That a civilized and decent 
society expects and approves such legislation indicates that 
governmental consideration of those differences in the vast 
majority of situations is not only legitimate but desirable. It 
may be, as CLC contends, that legislation designed to bene-
fit, rather than disadvantage, the retarded would generally 
withstand examination under a test of heightened scrutiny. 
See Brief for Respondents 38-41. The relevant inquiry, 
however, is whether heightened scrutiny is constitutionally 
mandated in the first instance. Even assuming that many of 
these laws could be shown to be substantially related to an 
important governmental purpose, merely requiring the legis-
lature to justify its efforts in these terms may lead it to re-
frain from acting at all. Much recent legislation intended to 
benefit the retarded also assumes the need for measures that 
11 CLC originally sought relief under the Act, but voluntarily dismissed 
this pendent state claim when the District Court indicated that its presence 
might make abstention appropriate. The Act had never been construed · 
by the Texas courts. App. 12, 14, 84-87. 
A number of states have passed legislation prohibiting zoning that ex-
cludes the retarded. See, e. g., Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 1566 et seq.; 
Conn. Gen Stat. § 8-3e; N. D. C. C. § 25-16-14(2); R. I. Gen. Laws. Tit. 
45, ch. 24 § 22. See also Md. Ann. Code, Health-General Article, § 7-102. 
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might be perceived to disadvantage them. The Education of 
the Handicapped Act, for example, requires an "appropriate" 
education, not one that is equal in all respects to the educa-
tion of non-retarded children; clearly, admission to a class 
that exceeded the abilities of a retarded child would not be 
appropriate. 12 Similarly, the Developmental Disabilities Act 
and the Texas act give the retarded the right to live only in 
the "least restrictive setting" appropriate to their abilities, 
implicitly assuming the need for at least some restrictions 
that would not be imposed on others. 13 Especially given the 
wide variation in the abilities and needs of the retarded them-
selves, governmental bodies must have a certain amount of 
flexibility and freedom from judicial oversight in shaping and 
limiting their remedial efforts. 
Third, the legislative response, which could hardly have oc-
curred and survived without public support, negates any 
claim that the mentally retarded are politically powerless in 
the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of 
the lawmakers. Any minority can be said to be powerless to 
assert direct control over the legislature, but if that were a 
criterion for higher level scrutiny by the courts, much eco-
nomic and social legislation would now be suspect. 
Fourth, if the large and amorphous class of the mentally 
retarded were deemed quasi-suspect for the reasons given by 
the Court of Appeals, it would be difficult to find a principled 
way to distinguish a variety of other groups who have per-
haps immutable disabilities setting them off from others, who 
cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative responses, 
and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part 
12 The Act, which specifically included the mentally retarded in its defini-
tion of handicapped, see 20 U. S. C. § 1401(1), also recognizes the great 
variations within the classification of retarded children. The Act requires 
that school authorities devise an "individualized eduational program," id., 
at § 1401(19), that is "tailored to the unique needs of the handicapped 
child." Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U. S. 176, 181 (1982). 
18 The Developmental Disabilities Act also prohibits the use of physical 
restraint "unless absolutely necessary." 42 U. S. C. § 6010(2). 
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of the public at large. One need mention in this respect only 
the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. We 
are reluctant to set out on that course, and we decline to do 
so. 
Doubtless, there have been and there will continue to be 
instances of discrimination against the retarded that are in 
fact invidious, and that are properly subject to judicial cor-
rection under constitutional norms. But the appropriate 
method of reaching such instances is not to create a new 
quasi-suspect classification and subject all governmental ac-
tion based on that classification to more searching evaluation. 
Rather, we should look to the likelihood that governmental 
action premised on a particular classification is valid as a gen-
eral matter, not merely to the specifics of the case before us. 
Because mental retardation is a characteristic that the gov-
ernment may legitimately take into account in a wide range 
of decisions, and because both state and federal governments 
have recently committed themselves to assisting· the re-
tarded, we will not presume that any given legislative action, 
even one that disadvantages retarded individuals, is rooted in 
considerations that the Constitution will not tolerate. 
IV 
Our refusal to recognize the retarded as a quasi-suspect 
class does not leave them entirely unprotected from invidious 
discrimination. To withstand equal protection review, legis-
lation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded and 
others must be rationally related to a legitimate govern-
mental purpose. This standard, we believe, affords govern-
ment the latitude necessary both to pursue policies designed 
to assist the retarded in realizing their full potential, and to 
freely and efficiently engage in activities that burden the re-
tarded in what is essentially an incidental manner. The 
State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an 
asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction ar-
bitrary or irrational. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U. S. 55, 
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61-63; United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 
413 U. S. 528, 535 (1973). Furthermore, some objectives-
such as "a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group," Moreno, 413 U. S., at 534--are not legitimate state 
interests. See also Zobel, supra, 457 U. S., at 63. Beyond 
that, the mentally retarded, like others, have and retain their 
substantive constitutional rights in addition to the right to be 
treated equally by the law. Our decision today in no way af-
fects those rights. 
The Court of Appeals, having settled on an intermediate 
level of scrutiny, did not attempt to assess the validity of the 
City's actions under the rational relationship standard. The 
application of the proper test is a task that we leave to the 
Court of Appeals in the first instance, particularly because 
the question is one "clouded by an ambiguity in state law." 14 
G. D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn, 455 U. S. 404, 413 (1982). Cf. 
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 345-346 (1976); Gooding v. 
Wilson, 405 U. S. 518, 524, and n. 2 (1972). 
The case is accordingly reversed and remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
14 The State of Texas and the State Deparment of Mental Health and 
Mental Retardation (TDMHMR) have submitted a brief as amici curiae in 
this Court, arguing that the city's denial of a special use permit runs 
counter to the State's policy favoring the establishment of group homes for 
the mentally retarded. See Mentally Retarded Persons Act of 1977, Tex. 
Rev. Civ. art. 5547-300. Furthermore, the State asserts that the city 
may not legitimately use its zoning powers to further the welfare of the 
retarded themselves, as distinguished from the welfare of the surrounding 
community. The State contends that judgments as to the ability of the 
retarded to live in a group home in a residential neighborhood lie within the 
exclusive province of the appropriate State agencies, and are not included 
within the purposes that have been delegated to the city as valid objectives 
of municipal zoning legislation. Brief for the State of Texas and the 
TDMHMR as Amici Curiae 13-14. The State did not raise these argu-
ments below, Tr. of Oral Arg. 30 (March 18, 1985), and we decline to ad-
dress them or assess their significance. 
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Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice White 
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I do think it would be prudent to qo ahead with a 
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June 5, 1985 
84-468 Citv of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center 
~ar Byron: 
I agree that the appropriate standard is the ra-
tional basis test. 
The case still presents two questions under that 
test: (i) facial validity of the ordinance, and (ii) its 
validity as applied. The fachsl validU:y auestion was ar-
gued here and presents a straightforward l~qal question. As 
I read the papers before us, the Clty offered no basis, ra-
tional or otherwfse, for the olassific~tions th~ ordinance 
draws. It has submttted no justification for treettnq the 
mentally retarded as comparable - for zoning ptHpoaes - to 
the insane, alcohol!cs and drug addicts. These are excluded 
from sa of the zoning ordtnance that permits within the 
zones hospitals, sanitari.ums, nur~inq homes, hom~~'s for con-
valescence or the aged, fraternity or sorority houses and 
dormitories. Of course, a legislative body has wide discre-
tion tn zoning classificatlone, but in this case the City 
has failed to show any legitimate interest for the curio.us 
classifications at issue. I would hold it facially invalid 
under the rational basts analysis. It then would be unnec-
essary to consider the quasi-suspect class question. 
If you prefer not to address and decide the facial 
validity issue, I may write a brief opinion concurring in 
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June 5, 1985 
Re: No. 84-468 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center 
Dear Byron, 
Lewis in his letter to you of June 5th suggests that 
the Court opinion decide the question of the facial validity 
of the city ordinance under the rational basis standard of 
review. I prefer the way in which your opinion now treats 
the question, and I had thought that it was in accord with 
five votes at Conference~ but it woul o bo er reatly 1 ~ 
to see urt 1 1 n eci · ity of the 
ordinance under the rational basis test. 
Lewis in his letter also suggests that in this event it 
would be "unnecessary to consider the quasi-suspect class 
question." I would hope you would not subscribe to this 
idea, because it would result in the case deciding 
absolutely nothing that was not already well known before we 
took it. The issue presented by the case was whether or not 
"heightened scrutiny" should be employed to review equal 
protection claims where made by the mentally retarded: the I 
Court of Appeals held that it should be, and we granted 
certiorari, I thought, to decide that question. To simply Ll~ 
"punt" and turn the case into one of five or six hundred tf 
decisions of this Court applying rational basis equal 
protection analysis to a particular ordinance would, to my 
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June 6, 1985 
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84-468 - City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center 
Dear Lewis, 
In response to your letter of yesterday about this case, I 
note first your agreement that the appropriate Equal Protection 
standard is rationality. This is in line with the Conference 
vote, and it is therefore evident that the Court of Appeals 
judged this case under the wrong rule of law. In such cases, the 
usual practice is to remand for reconsideration in light of the 
proper standard. This also was the Confence vote, and the present 
draft follows that course. I much prefer it. ' 
Even if the validity of the ordinance is to be decided here, 
[
I see no persuasive reason for not announcing that rationality is 
the governing standard. That is the issue we took this case to 
decide, there is a clear majority for that standard, and not 
saying so will leave in place an erroneous Fifth Circuit 
precedent that will govern the District Courts in that Circuit. 
I doubt that we would have granted this case had it involved only 
whether the rational basis standard had been properly applied; 
yet confining our decision to the rationality of the zoning law 
indicates a contrary result. 
On the issue of validity, you assert that the ordinance is 
invalid on its face and pay no attention to the as-applied issue, 
which you say is before us. But I had thought that a state law 
is not facially invalid unless it is unconti tutional in all of 
its reasonably possible appiTcations. TO" put- it the other way, 
if~Cm€~ore acceptable applications, it cannot be 
facially invalid. This means to me that the as-applied issue 
should be decided first and the proffered grounds for sustaining 
the ord1n 1 1s context either accepted or rejected. If 
accepted, the ordinance is neither invalid as applied or on its 
face. If rejected, the ordinance is invalid as apQlied, and 
{
there is no neea to strike it down- ent1rely. As I have said, the 
as-a~--wo~beSE-addresssed by the lower courts in 
. the first instance. 
You suggest that the ordinance is facially infirm because 
no reasons are given for classifying, for special permit 
purposes, the mentally retarded with the insane, alcoholics, and 
drug addicts. But this issue is not how alike or different from 
those groups the mentally retarded are but whether they can 
constitutionally be required to have a housing permit when 
others, such as sanatoriums and nursing homes for the aged, need 
not do so. In view of the fact that mental retardation covers a 
wide spectrum in terms of the degree of disability involved, I 
find it difficult to believe that the special permit r~~JJement 
would be invaljd with respect to eacn--·-a:na--e-ve·ry group of the 
meri'1:aTIY.._ __ r~e-ta.rded, regardless of the degree of their 
retardation. It may be that in light of the character is tics of 
the group involved in this case and in light of the city's 
proffered justifications, the special permit cannot 
constitutionally be denied. But this would not be a facial 
invalidity holding. 
I should say that if the Court is not to announce the proper \ 
standard of review, the case should be reassigned. If the 
opinion deals with that issue, I perhaps can accommodate myself 
to the majority's desires as to whether to reach the validity · 
issue, as well as to either result that the majority might reach 
on that question. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
·. 
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To: Justice Powell 
From: Annmarie 
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of retardation, he statute does not account for such differences , 
-~· It subJects all the mentally retarded to the same 
~ burden. Thus, while one can conceive of an ordinance th~ ~·~ 
rationally subjected certain subclasses of the reta~~to 
special requirements, that is not this ordinance. ~he City has 
failed to offer any rational basis for treating all the mentally 
retarded one way, and all residents of nursing homes, 
fraternities, etc., differently. The classification of the 
mentally retarded with the insane, drug addicts, and alcoholics 
suggests that prejudice, rather than reason, informed the City's 
treatment of the mentally retarded ~uRder the ordiftance. For 
these reasons, I thin-k we- ~ho~d holo ~ ordinance invalid on 
its face. It -~~ h ~ftu.... 
I ~would go along, however, with a holding that 
ordinance was invalid as applied in this case. The DC found 
specifically that if the residents of the home were not mentally 
retarded, but the home were the same in all other respects, the 
use would have been permitted. CAS reached the same conclusion. 
Moreover, the City offered no justification for denying a permit 
to the particular residents of the home. Thus, even if we assume 
that the City c~~~¥9 a ratjo~al basis for requiring group 
homes for some kinds of entally retarded to obtain a special 
permit, there is nothin in the record supporting the denial of 
the permit to the part' ular individuals involved in this case • 
. '. 
CHA"1BERS Of' 
h,vrtnt.t <lJDUrl of lltt ~lt JUalt# 
Jla#lfington, ~. <!J. 211~~~ 
JUSTICE: SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
June 6, 1985 
Re: 84-468 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center 
Dear Byron, 
I will still be with you if you decide the 
statute is facially invalid, as Lewis suggests, but 
I also agree with Bill Rehnquist that we should 
decide the quasi-suspect class issue in any event. 
Sincerely, 
Justice White 
Copies to: Justice Powell 
Justice Rehnquist 
June 7, 1985 
84-468 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center 
Dear Byron: 
Thi.s is in reoly to your letter of the 6th. 
I enclose copies of my longhann notes prepared 
prior to our Conference. My view was that the "ordinance on 
its face [is] invalid under the rational basis standard." I 
also enclos~ my Conference notes that are a bit conc1usor.y. 
I recorded an alternative vote: "Remand to CA (or could 
affirm on rational basis)". I also note~ my view that the 
"ordinance flunks rational basis test on its face". l can 
understand, ho\o~ever, that my sta temf.!'nt at Conference \'Tas 
unclear as to my preference. 
In 'l!Y letter of .June 5, I expreserJ the view that if 
we held the ordinance facially invalid it would be unneces-
sary to consider th~ quasi-susoe~t cla~s queqtinn. ~h~re is 
a good deal to your point, ho\1C\7P.r, that the question is 
here and needq rP.Rolving. I would ~e willing to join an 
opinion holding t~~t onlv the rational basis standard i~ 
applic~ble. 
Finally, vou suqgest that perhaps it would be in-
appropriate to make a -FaciAl :invali..:"!itv hoJ··Hn('!. I am still 
inclined to think, in view of the recor~ hefore us, that 
such a holrlinq wouln be entirelv aonronri.ate. The or( i.nance 
certainly c1iscriminatPs against the mentally retar(~e,.-1 in 
that it requires a sPecial perrnit to mnintain a group home 
for m~ntally retRr~ed rPsi~ents. The or~inanc~ n19o makes 
the irrational distinction (as I view it) beh1een all men-
tally retarr!ed persons and residents of other tvpes of homes 
permitted in this district, as well as treatfnq the retarded 
as if they invariably were falrly comparable to the insane, 
drug addicts and alcoholics. I find nothing in the record 
that suggests a legitimate state interest for this discrimi-
natory treatment. 
Thus my preference continues to be to hold the 
ordinance facially invalid. I would join four to make a 
Court, however, in a holdina that the ordinance was invalid 
as applie~ in this case as it flunks the rational basis 
standard. 
In view of the last paragraph in your letter, I 
take it that our views can be reconciled. 
Justice t"'hite 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
-~----------------~-~--------,.,___.. 
CHAMBERS O F 
JUSTICE WM . J . 6RENNAN, JR. 
J une 10, 1985 
No. 845-468 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center 
Dear Lewis, 
I have read your correspondence 
with Byron. Is not my impression 
correct that, if you adhere to your view 
that the ordinance is facially invalid, 
there is a Court for that holding 




Copies to the Conference 
. . 
June 10 , 1985 
84-468 City of Cleburne v . Cleburne Living Center 
Dear Bill: 
In rnv tec~nt l~tter to Byron, T said th,t although 
my nreferf'nc-= ~~,a~ to ~oJC! the orrHn~nce far:t~llv invalid on 
ration~l ha~is analvo:;i~, I '.vou11 cnnc;ider ioininq an Ol?inion 
that invali~ated t~~ or~1n~nce a~ ary~lie~ . 
I also now agree that we shoul0 der.:ine explicitly 
that rational ~asis t~ the proper ~tan~ard . This will be 
the prPcedent t~at counts . 
Sincerely, 
Just ice Bn:mnan 
lfp/ss 
cc : The Conference 
.. 
,jltp'ttntt <!Ill'llrl O'f tlft ~tb ;%tldt.&' 
~~n.~.<!I· 2n~~~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
84-468 -
June 10, 1985 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center 
Dear Lewis, 
In response to your letter of June 7 and 
following our conversation of today, I shall 
make a try at invalidating the ordinance on 
an as-applied basis. You indicate that you 
could join if there were four others f~ this 
approach. We shall see if it flies. ______. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
f • 
I 
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From: Justice White 
Circulated:---------
Recirculated: _JU_N_l-'-1_19_85 __ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-468 · 
. 
CITY OF CLEBURNE, TEXAS,-ET AL., PETITIONERS 
v. CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[June -, 1985] 
. JusTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
A Texas city denied a special use permit for the operation 
of a group home for the mentally retarded, acting pursuant to 
a municipal zoning ordinance requiring permits for such 
homes. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that 
mental retardation is a "quasi-suspect" classification and that 
the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause because it 
did not substantially further an important governmental 
purpose. We hold that a lesser standard of scrutiny is ap-
propriate, but conclude that under that standard the ordi-
nance is invalid as applied in this case. 
I 
In July, 1980, respondent Jan Hannah purchased a building 
at 201 Featherston Street in the city of Cleburne, Texas, 
with the intention of leasing it to Cleburne Living Centers, 
Inc. (CLC), 1 for the operation of a group home for the men-
tally retarded. It was anticipated that the home would 
house 13 retarded men and women, who would be under the 
constant supervision of CLC staff members. The house had 
'Cleburne Living Centers, Inc., is' now known as Community Living 
Concepts, Inc. Hannah is the Vice-President and part owner of CLC. 
For convenience, both Hannah and CLC will be referred to as "CLC." A 
third respondent is Advocacy, Inc., a non-profit corporation that provides 
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four bedrooms and two baths, with a half bath to be added. 
CLC planned to comply with all applicable state and federal 
regulations. 2 
The city informed CLC that a special use permit would be 
required for the operation of a group home at the site, and 
CLC accordingly submitted a permit application. In re-
sponse to a subsequent inquiry from CLC, the city explained 
that under the zoning regulations applicabl~ to the site, a spe-
cial use permit, renewable annually, was required for the 
construction of "[h]ospitals for the insane or feeble-minded, 
or alcoholic [sic] or drug addicts, o:r penal or correctional in-
stitutions." 3 The city had determined that the proposed 
1 It was anticipated that the home would be operated as a private Level 
I Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded, or ICF-MR, 
under a program providing for joint federal-State reimbursement for resi-
dential services for mentally retarded clients. See 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1396d(a)(15); Tex. Hum. Res. Code § 32.001 et seq. ICF -MR's are cov-
ered by extensive regulations and guidelines established by the United 
States Department of Health and Human Services and the Texas Depart-
ments of Human Resources, Mental Health and Mental Retardation, and 
Health. See App. 92. See also 42 CFR § 442 et seq.; 25 Tex. Adm. Code, 
Title 40, § 27 et seq. 
1 The site of the home is in an area zoned "R-3," an "Apartment House 
District." App. 51. Section 8 of the Cleburne zoning ordinance, in perti-
nent part, allows the following uses in an R-3 district: 
"1. Any use permitted in District R-2. 
"2. Apartment houses, or multiple dwellings. 
"3. Boarding and lodging houses. 
"4. Fraternity or sorority houses and dormitories. 
"5. Apartment hotels. 
"6. Hospitals, sanitariums, nursing hom~ or homes for convalescents or 
aged, otMr than for the insane or feeb~-minded or alcoholics or drug 
addicts." 
"7. Private clubs or fraternal orders, except those whose chief activity is 
carried on as a business. 
"8. Philanthropic or eleemosynary institutions, other than penal 
institutions. 
"9. Accessory uses customarily incident to any of the above uses . . . " 
App. 60-61 (emphasis added). 
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group home should be classified as a ''hospital for the feeble-
minded." After holding a public hearing on CLC's applica-
tion, the city council voted three to one to deny a special use 
permit. 4 
CLC then filed suit in Federal District Court against the 
city and a number of its officials, alleging, inter alia, that the 
zoning ordinance was invalid on its face and as applied be-
cause it discriminated against the mentally retarded in viola-
tion of the equal protection rights of CLC and its potential 
residents. The District CoUJ1; found that "[i]f .the potential 
residents of the Featherston Street home were not mentally 
retarded, but the home was the same in all other respects, its 
use would be permitted under the city's zoning ordinance," 
and that the city council's decision "was motivated primarily 
by the fact that the residents of the home would be persons 
who are mentally retarded." App. at 93, 94. Even so, the 
District Court held the ordinance and its application constitu-
tional. Concluding that no fundamental right was implicated 
and that mental retardation was neither a suspect nor a 
quasi-suspect classification, the court employed the minimum 
level of judicial scrutiny applicable to equal protection claims. 
The court deemed the ordinance, as written and applied, to 
be rationally related to the City's legitimate interests in "the 
legal responsibility of CLC and its residents, . . . the safety 
and fears of residents in the adjoining neighborhood," and the 
Section 16 of the ordinance specifies the uses for which a special use per-
mit is required. These include "[h]ospitals for the insane or feeble-
minded, or alcoholic or drug addicts, or penal or correctional institutions." 
App. 63. Section 16 provides that a permit for such a use may be issued by 
"the Governing Body, after public hearing, and after recommendation of 
the Planning Commission." All special use permits are limited to one 
year, and each applicant is required "to obtain the signatures of the prop-
erty owners within two hundred (200) feet of the property to be used." 
Ibid. 
4 The City's Planning and Zoning Commission had earlier held a hearing 
and voted to deny the permit. App. 91. 
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number of people to be housed in the home.5 !d., at 105. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, deter-
mining that mental retardation was a quasi-suspect classifica-
tion and that it should assess the validity of the ordinance 
under intermediate-level scrutiny. 726 F. 2d 191 (1984). 
Because mental retardation was in fact relevant to many leg-
islative actions, strict scrutiny was not appropriate. But in 
light of the history of ''unfair and often ~tesque mistreat-
ment" of the retarded, discrimination ag;rlnst them was 
''likely to reflect deep-seated.prejudice." !d., at 197. In ad-
dition, the mentally retarded lacked. political power, and their 
condition was immutable. The court considered heightened 
scrutiny to be particularly appropriate in this case, because 
the City's ordinance withheld a benefit which, although not 
fundamental, was very important to the mentally retarded. 
Without group homes, the court stated, the retarded could 
never hope to integrate themselves into the community.6 
Applying the test that it considered appropriate, the court 
held that the ordinance was invalid on its face because it did 
not substantially further any important governmental inter-
ests. The Court of Appeals went on to hold that the ordi-
nance was also invalid as applied. 7 Rehearing en bane was 
'The District Court also rejected CLC's other claims, including the ar-
gument that the City had violated due process by improperly delegating its 
zoning powers to the owners of adjoining property. Cf. State ofWashin.g-
ton ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U. S. 116 (1928). App. 
105. The Court of Appeals did not address this argument, and it has not 
been raised by the parties in this Court. 
• The District Court had found that 
"[g]roup homes currently are the principal community living alternatives 
for persons who are mentally retarded. The availability of such a home in 
communities is an essential ingredient of normal living patterns for persons 
who are mentally retarded, and each factor that makes such group homes 
harder to establish operates to exclude persons who are mentally retarded 
from the community." App. 94. 
1 The City relied on a recently passed State regulation limiting group 
homes to six residents in support of its argument that the CLC home would 
be overcrowded with thirteen. But, the Court of Appeals observed, the 
·.' 
84-468-0PINION 
CLEBURNE v. CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER 5 
denied with six judges dissenting in an opinion urging en 
bane consideration of the panel's adoption of a heightened 
standard of review. We granted certiorari, -- U. S. --
(1984).8 
II 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment commands that no state shall "deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," which 
is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated 
should be treated alike. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. ~- 202, 216 
City had failed to justify its apparent view that any other group of thirteen 
people could live under these allegedly "crowded" conditions, nor had it ex-
plained why six would be acceptable but thirteen not. 
CLC concedes that it could not qualify for certification under the new 
Texas regulation. Tr. Oral Arg. 31 (April 23, 1985). The Court of Ap-
peals stated that the new regulation applied only to applications made after 
May 1, 1982, and therefore did not apply to the CLC home. 726 F. 2d, at 
202. The regulation itself contains no grandfather clause, see App. 78-81, 
and the District Court made no specific finding on this point. See App. 96. 
However, the State has asserted in an amicus brief filed in this Court that 
"'the six bed rule' would not pose an obstacle to the proposed Featherston 
Street group home at issue in this case." Brief for the State of Texas and 
the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation as Amici 
Curiae 15, n. 7. If the six-bed requirement were to apply to the home, 
there is a serious possibility that CLC would no longer be interested in in-
junctive relief. David Southern, an officer of CLC, testifed that "to break 
even on a facility of this type, you have to have at least ten or eleven resi-
dents." App. 32. However, because CLC requested damages as well as 
an injunction, see App. 15, the case would not be moot. 
1 Macon Association for Retarded Citizens v. Macon-Bibb County 
Planning and Zoning CommiBBBion, 314 S. E. 2d 218 (Ga.), dismissed for 
want of a substantial federal question,- U. S. -- (1984), has no con-
trolling effect on this case. Macon Association/or Retarded Citizens in-
volved an ordinance that had the effect of excluding a group home for the 
retarded only because it restricted dwelling units to those occupied by a 
single family, defined as no more than four unrelated persons. In Village 
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1 (1974), we upheld the constitutionality 
of a similar ordinance, and the Georgia Supreme Court in Macon Associa-
tion specifically held that the ordinance did not discriminate against the re-
tarded. 314 S. E. 2d, at 221. 
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(1982). Section 5 of the Amendment empowers Congress to 
enforce this mandate, but absent controlling Congressional 
direction, the Courts have themselves devised standards for 
determining the validity of state legislation or other offical I 
action that is challenged as denying equal protection. The 
general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and 
will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is 
rationally related to a legitimate sta e · er st. Schweiker 
v. Wi son, 50 . . 221, (1981); ·United States Railroad 
Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 174-)75 (1980); 
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93, 97 (1979); New Orleans v. 
Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 303 (1976). When social or economic 
legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the 
states wide latitude, United States Railroad Retirement 
Board v. Fritz, supra, at 174 (1980); New Orleans v. Dukes, 
supra, at 303, and the Constitution presumes that even im-
provident decisions will eventually be rectified by the demo-
cratic processes. 
The g neral e ·v w , ho te clas-
sifies by race alie e or nati nal ori · . These factors are 
so seldom relevant to e ac · evement of any legitimate state 
interest that laws grounded in such considerations are 
deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy-a view that those 
in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as oth-
ers. For these reasons and because such discrimination is 
unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means, these laws 
are subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if 
they are suitably tailored to a serve a compelling state 
intersts. McLaughlin v. Florida,-·379 U. S. 184, 192 (1964); 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971). Similar over-
sight by the courts is due when state laws impinge on per-
sonal rights protected by the Constitution. Kramer v. 
Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U. S. 621 (1969); 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969); Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 u. s. 535 (1942). 
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Legislative classifications based on gender also call for a 
heightened standard of review. That factor generally pro-
vides no sensible ground for differential treatment. "[W]hat 
differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelli-
gence or physical disability . . . is that the sex characteristic 
frequently bears no relationship to ability to perform or con-
tribute to society." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677, 
686 (1973) (plurality opinion). Rather than resting on mean-
ingful considerations, statutes distributing benefits and bur-
dens between the sexes in different ways very likely reflect 
outmoded notions of the relative .capabilities ·of men and 
women. A gender classification fails unless it is substan-
tially related to a sufficiently important governmental inter-
est. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 
718 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190 (1971). Because 
illegitimacy is beyond the individual's control and bears "no 
relation to the individual's ability to participate in and con-
tribute to society," Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 505 
(1976), official discriminations resting on that characteristic 
are also subject to somewhat heightened review. Those re-
strictions ''will survive equal protection scrutiny to the ex-
tent that they are substantially related to a legitimate state 
interest." Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U. S. 91, 99 (1982). 
We have declined, however, to extend heightened review 
to differential treatment based on age: 
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not 
been wholly free of discrimination, such persons, unlike, 
say, those who have been discriminated against on the 
basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a 
''history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been sub-
jected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped 
characteristics not truly indicative of~eir ilities. 
Massachusetts Board of Retirement . Mu , 427 
u. s. 307' 313 (1976). 
The lesson of Murgia is that where individuals in the group 
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to interests the state has the authority to implement, the 
courts have been very reluctant, as they should be in our fed-
eral system and with our respect for the separation of pow-
ers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to whether, 
how and to what extent those interests should be pursued. 
In such cases, the Equal Protection Clause requires only a 
rational means to serve a legitimate end. 
III 
Against this background, we conclude for several reasons 
that the Court of Appeals erred in holding mental retardation I 
a quasi-suspect classification calling for a more exacting 
standard of judicial review than is normally accorded eco-
nomic and social legislation. First, it is undeniable, and it is 
not argued otherwise here, that those who are mentally re-
tarded have a reduced ability to cope with and function in the 
everyday world. Nor are they all cut from the same pattern: 
as the testimony in this record indicates, they range from 
those whose disability is not immediately evident to those 
who must be constantly cared for.• They are thus different, 
• Mentally retarded individuals fall into four distinct categories. The 
vast majority-approximately ~ classified as "mildly" retarded, 
meaning that their IQ is between 50 and 70. Approximately 6% percent 
are "moderately" retarded, with IQs between 35 and 50. The remaining 
two categories are "severe" (IQs of 20 to 35) and "profound" (IQs below 
20). These last two categories together account for about 5% of the men-
tally retarded population. App. 39 (testimony of Dr. Philip Roos). 
Mental retardation is not defined by reference to intelligence or IQ 
alone, however. The American Association on Mental Deficiency (AAMD) 
has defined mental retardation as "significantly subaverage general intel-
lectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior 
and manifested during the developmental period." Brief for AAMD et al. 
as Amici Curiae 3 (quoting AAMD, Classification in Mental Retardation 1 
(H. Grossman ed. 1983)). "Deficits in adaptive behavior" are limitations 
on general ability to meet the standards of maturation, learning, personal 
independence, and social responsibility expected for an individual's age 
level and cultural group. ld., at 4, n. 1. Mental retardation is caused by 
a variety of factors, some genetic, some environmental, and some un-
known. ld., at 4. 
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immutably so, in relevant respects, and the states' interest in 
dealing with and providing for them is plainly a legitmate 
one. 10 How this large and diversified group is to be treated 
under the law is a difficult and often a technical matter, very 
much a task for legislators guided by qualified professionals 
and not by the perhaps ill-informed opinions of the judiciary. 
Heightened scrutiny inevitably involves substantive judg-
ments about legislative decisions, and we doubt that the 
predicate for such judicial oversight is present where the 
classification deals with mental retardation. 
Second, the distinctive legislative response, both national 
and state, to the plight of those who are mentally retarded 
demonstrates not only that they have unique problems, but 
also that the lawmakers have been addressing their difficul-
ties in a manner that belies a continuing antipathy or preju-
dice and a corresponding need for more intrusive oversight 
by the judiciary. Thus, the federal government has not only 
outlawed discrimination against the mentally retarded in fed-
erally funded programs, see § 504 of the Rehabilitation Ac of 
1973, 29 U. S. C. § 794, but it has also provided the retarded 
with the right to receive "appropriate treatment, services, 
and habilitation" in a setting that is "least restrictive of 
[their] personal liberty." Developmental Disabilities and 
Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S.C. §6010(1), (2). In addition, 
the government has conditioned federal education funds on a 
State's assurance that retarded children will enjoy an educa-
18 As Dean Ely has observed: 
"Surely one has to feel sorry for a person disabled by something he or she 
can't do anything about, but I'm not aware of any reason to suppose that 
elected officials are unusually unlikely to share that feeling. Moreover, 
classifications based on physical disability and intelligence are typically ac-
cepted as legitimate, even by judges and commentators who assert that im-
mutability is relevant. The explanation, when one is given, is that those 
characteristics (unlike the one the commentator is trying to render sus-
pect) are often relevant to legitimate purposes. At that point there's not 
much left of the immutability theory, is there?" J. Ely, Democracy and 
Distrust 160 (1980) (footnote omitted). See also id., at 164-155. 
j 
84-46&--0PINION 
10 CLEBURNE v. CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER 
tion that, "to the maximum extent appropriate," is integrated 
with that of non-mentally retarded children. Education of 
the Handicapped Act, 20 U. S. C. § 1412(5)(B). The govern-
ment has also facilitated the hiring of the mentally retarded 
into the federal civil service by exempting them from the re-
quirement of competitive examination. See 5 CFR 
§ 213-3102(t) (1984). The State of Texas has similarly en-
acted legislation that acknowledges the special status of the 
mentally retarded by conferring certain rights upon them, 
such as ''the right to live in the least restrictive setting appro-
priate to [their] individual need!) and abilities," including ''the 
right to live ... in a group home." · Mentally Retarded Per-
sons Act of 1977, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5547-300, 
§7.11 
Such legislation thus singling out the retarded for special 
treatment reflects the real and undeniable differences be-
tween the retarded and others. That a civilized and decent 
society expects and approves such legislation indicates that 
governmental consideration of those differences in the vast 
majority of situations is not only legitimate but desirable. It 
may be, as CLC contends, that legislation designed to bene-
fit, rather than disadvantage, the retarded would generally 
withstand examination under, a test of heightened scrutiny. 
See Brief for Respondents 38-41. The relevant inquiry, 
however, is whether heightened scrutiny is constitutionally 
mandated in the first instance. Even assuming that many of 
these laws could be shown to be substantially related to an 
important governmental purpose, merely requiring the legis-
lature to justify its efforts in these tenns may lead it to re-
11 CLC originally sought relief under the-Act, but voluntarily dismissed 
this pendent state claim when the District Court indicated that its presence 
might make abstention appropriate. The Act had never been construed 
by the Texas courts. App. 12, 14, 84-87. 
A number of states have passed legislation prohibiting zoning that ex-
cludes the retarded. See, e. g., Cal. Health & Saf. Code §1566 et seq.; 
Conn. Gen Stat. § 8-3e; N. D. C. C. § 25-16-14(2); R. I. Gen. Laws. Tit. 
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frain from acting at all. Much recent legislation intended to 
benefit the retarded also assumes the need for measures that 
might be perceived to disadvantage them. The Education of 
the Handicapped Act, for example, requires an "appropriate" 
education, not one that is equal in all respects to the educa-
tion of non-retarded children; clearly, admission to a class 
that exceeded the abilities of a retarded child would not be 
appropriate. 12 Similarly, the Developmental Disabilities Act 
and the Texas act give the retardeq the right to live only in 
the ''least restrictive setting" appropriate to their abilities, 
implicitly assuming the need· for ~t least some ·restrictions 
that would not be imposed on others. 13 Especially given the 
wide variation in the abilities and needs of the retarded them-
selves, governmental bodies must have a certain amount of 
flexibility and freedom from judicial oversight in shaping and 
limiting their remedial efforts. 
Third, the legislative response, which could hardly have oc-
curred and survived without public support, negates any 
claim that the mentally retarded are politically powerless in 
the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of 
the lawmakers. Any minority can be said to be powerless to 
assert direct control over the legislature, but if that were a 
criterion for higher level scrutiny by the courts, much eco-
nomic and social legislation would now be suspect. 
Fourth, if the large and amorphous class of the mentally 
retarded were deemed quasi-suspect for the reasons given by 
the Court of Appeals, it would be difficult to find a principled 
way to distinguish a variety of other groups who have per-
11 The Act, which specifically included the mentally retarded in its defini-
tion of handicapped, see 20 U. S. C. §1401(1), also recognizes the great 
variations within the classification of retarded children. The Act requires 
that school authorities devise an "individualized eduational program," id. , 
at § 1401(19), that is "tailored to the unique needs of the handicapped 
child." Board of Education v. R(1Wley, 458 U. S. 176, 181 (1982). 
\ 
11 The Developmental Disabilities Act also withholds public funds from 
any program that does not prohibit the use of physical restraint "unless ab-
solutely necessary." 42 U.S. C. §6010(2). 
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haps immutable disabilities setting them off from others, who 
cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative responses, 
and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part 
of the public at large. One need mention in this respect only 
the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. We 
are reluctant to set out on that course, and we decline to do 
so. 
Doubtless, there have been and there ~ll continue to be 
instances of discrimination against the retarded that are in 
fact invidious, and that are· properly subject to judicial cor-
rection under constitutional ·norms. But the 'llppropriate 
method of reaching such instances is not to create a new 
quasi-suspect classification and subject all governmental ac-
tion based on that classification to more searching evaluation. 
Rather, we should look to the likelihood that governmental 
action premised on a particular classification is valid as a gen-
eral matter, not merely to the specifics of the case before us. 
Because mental retardation is a characteristic that the gov-
ernment may legitimately take into account in a wide range 
of decisions, and because both state and federal governments 
have recently committed themselves to assisting the re-
tarded, we will not presume that any given legislative· action, 
even one that disadvantages retarded individuals, is rooted in 
considerations that the Constitution will not tolerate. 
Our refusal to recognize the retarded as a quasi-suspect 
class does not leave them entirely unprotected from invidious 
discrimination. To withstand equal protection review, legis-
lation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded and 
others must be rationally related to a legitimate govern-
mental purpose. This standard, we believe, affords govern-
ment the latitude necessary both to pursue policies designed 
to assist the retarded in realizing their full potential, and to 
freely and efficiently engage in activities that burden the re-
tarded in what is essentially an incidental manner. The 
State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an 
asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction ar-
84-468-0PINION 
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bitrary or irrational. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U. S. 55, 
61-63; United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 
413 U. S. 528, 535 (1973). Furthennore, some objectives-
such as "a bare . . . desire to hann a politically unpopular 
group," Moreno, 413 U. S., at 534-are not legitimate state 
interests. See also Zobel, supra, 457 U. S., at 63. Beyond 
that, the mentally retarded, like others, have and retain their 
substantive constitutional rights in addition to the right to be 
treated equally by the law. 
IV 
We turn to the issue of the validity of the zoning ordinance 
insofar as it requires a special use permit !Qr homes for the 
mentally retarded. 14 We mqui:i=e!U=Stwhetherdenymg a 
speCiil use permit for the Featherston lJ.Q..rne in the circum-
stances here deprives responaents of the equal protection of 
the laws. If it does, there will be no occasion to decide } ~ ~ 
w ther the s ecial use ermit rovision ~alid \ ..,4 d""-<- .... t. 
where the men y re e are tpvolve ' or 0 pu 1 an- ~ r __, ~ ~ /. 
other way, whether the cit ne've · ist n a s cial use 1 tJ ____.. 
permit for a home for e mentall r zone. -
This ts e pre e!Ted course o adjudication since it enables 
courts to avoid making uru:tecessarily broad constitutional 
judgments. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades,-- U.S.--, 
- (1985); United States v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171 (1983); 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963). 
The constitutional issue is clearly posed. The City does 
not require a special use permit in an R-3 zone for apartment 
houses, multiple dwellings, boarding and lodging houses, fra-
ternity or sorority houses, do~tories, apartment hotels, 
hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes for convalescents or 
the aged (other than for .the insane or feeble-minded or alco-
holics or drug addicts), private clubs or fraternal orders, and 
u It goes without saying that there is nothing before us with respect to 
the validity of requiring a special use pennit for the other uses listed in the 
ordinance. Seen. 3, I'Upra. 
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other specified uses. It does, however, insist on a special 
pennit for the Featherstonnorne, and it does so, as the Dis-
trict oUrt oun , because it would be a facility for the men-
tally retarded. May the city denythe permit to this facility I 
when other care and multiple dwelling facilities are freely 
pennitted? 
It is true, as already pointed out, that the mentally re-
tarded as a group are indeed different from others not shar-
ing their misfortune, and in this respect they may be differ-
ent from those who would occupy other facilities that would 
be pennitted in an R-3 zone without a special pennit. But 
this difference · ~el irrelevant ess the Featherston 
horne and t ose who woul occupy it wo eaten •ti-
mafe interests of t e cit in a wa that other nnitted uses 
sue as boarding hous s d hos "tals w d not. ~ in 
our VIew the reco d s not reveal an rat· · or be-
lievin that the Feath.erston h.orne would se any s cial 
threat to the city's egttlrnate mterests, we affirm the JUdg-
ment below insofar as it holds the ordinance invalid as applied 
~e. <:e. ---...,__..., ____...._,_.___ ' 
The District Court found that the City Council's denial of 
the pennit rested on sever.al factors. First, the Council was 
concerned with the negative ,attitude of the majority of prop-
erty owners located within 200 feet of the Featherston facil-
ity, as well as with the fears of elderly residents of the neigh-
borhood. But mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstanti-
ated by factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning 
proceeding, is not a permissible basis for treating a horne for 
the mentally retarded differently from apartment houses, 
multiple dwellings, and the like. --It is plain that the elector-
ate as a whole, whether by referendum or or otherwise, could 
not order city action violative of the Equal Protection clause, 
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 
U. S. 713, 736-737 (1964), and the City may not avoid the 
strictures of that Clause by deferring to the wishes or objec-
tions of some fraction of the body politic. "Private biases 
~- , . 
~? 
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may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, di-
rectly or indirectly, give them effect." Palmore v. Sidoti, 
- u. s. -, - (1984). 
Second, the Council had two objections to the location of 
the facility. It was concerned that the facility was across the 
street from a junior high school, and it feared that the stu-
dents might harass the occupants of the Featherston home. 
But the school itself is attended b about 30 mentall re-
tarded stu_ ents, and enymg a perrrut base on such vague, 
una iffereiitiated fears is again perm1tting some portion of the 
community to validate what would otherwise be· an equal pro-
tection violation. The other objection to the home's location 
was that it was located on a ve hundred year flood plain." 
This concern with the possibility of a flood, however, can 
hardly be based on a distinction between the Featherston 
home and, for example, nursing homes, homes for convales-
cents or the aged, or sanitariums or hospitals, any of which 
could be located on the Featherston site without obtaining a 
special use permit. The same may be said of another con-
cern of the Council-doubts about the legal responsibility for 
actions which the mentally retarded might take. If there is 
no concern about legal responsibility with respect to other 
uses that would be permitted in the area, such as boarding 
and fraternity houses, it is difficult to believe that the groups 
of mildly or moderately mentally retarded individuals who 
would live at 201 Featherston would present any different or 
special hazard. 
Fourth, the Council was concerned with the size of the 
home and the number of people that would occupy it. The 
District Court found, and the Court of Appeals repeated, }/J <:_ 
that ''if the potential residents of the Featherston Street 
home were not mentally retarded, but the home was the 
same in all other respects, its use would be permitted under 
the city's zoning ordinance." ·· App. 93; 726 F. 2d, at 200. 
Give~ing, there would be no restrictions on the num-
ber of people who could occupy t · orne as a oar ing 
~
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house, nursing horne, family dwelling, fraternity house, or 
dormitory. The question is whether it is rational to treat the 
mentally retarded differently. It is true that they suffer dis-
ability not shared by others; but why this difference warrants 
a density regulation that others need not observe is not at all 
apparent. At least this record does not clarify how, in this 
connection, the characteristics of the intended occupants of 
the Featherston home rationally ;justifies denying to those oc-
cupants what would be permitted to groups occupying the 
same site for different purposes. Those who would live in 
the Featherston home are t~ht of individual~ who, with 
supporting staff, satisfy fede ai state standards for group 
housing in the community; an ere is no dispute that the 
home would meet the federal square-footage-per-resident re-
quirement for facilities of this type. See 42 CFR § ~447 
(1984). In the words of the Court of Appeals, "The City ) 
never justifies its apparent view that other people can live 
under such 'crowded' conditions when mentally retarded per-
sons cannot." 726 F. 2d, at 202. 
In the courts below the city also urged that the ordinance is 
aimed at avoiding concentration of population and at lessen-
.ing congestion of the streets. These concerns obviously fail 
to explain why apartment houses, fraternity and sorority 
houses, hospitals and the like, may freely locate iil the area 
without a permit. So, too, the expressed worry about fire 
hazards, the serenity of the neighborhood, and the avoidance 
of danger to other residents fail rationally to justify singling 
out a home such as 201 Featherston for the special use per-
mit, yet imposing no such restrictions on the many other uses 
freely permitted in the neighborhood. .., 
The s ort · is that denial of the' l 
pe:~--~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
tally retarded, me u mg t ose w o would occupy the 
Featherston facility and who would live under the closely su-
pervised and highly regulated conditions expressly provided 
for by state and federal law. 
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.\ The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed insofar as 
it invalidates the zoning ordinance as applied to the 
Featherston home. The judgment is otherwise vacated. 
It is so ordered. 
CH ... MBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
~ltp'ttmtr-<Jtoud Df l4t Jnittlt ~talt.e­
·~lhudtiqton.~. Of. 21lp~~ 
June 12, 1985 
No. 84-468 City of Cleburne, Texas v. 
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I am still with you on this. 
Sincerely, 
Justice White 
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June 12, 1985 
Re: No. 84-468 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center 
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cc: The Conference 
aml 6/13/85 
To: Justice Powell 
From: Annmarie 
Re: City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center 
No. 84-468 
I am a bit confused by Justice White's third draft in this 
case, although I think much of the new section, Part IV, is quite 
good. There are three poss1 e 1nterpretations o-f the Court •'s 
fiOlding: (1) the ordinance is invalid as applied insofar as it 
requires this group home to obtain a special use permit: (2) the 
ordinance is invalid as applied insofar as the City denied this 
group home a special use permit: (3) the ordinance is invalid on 
its face because there is no rational basis for requiring group 
homes for the mentally retarded to obtain a special permit. From 
the correspondence and the opening paragraph of part IV, it is 
clear that Justice White thinks of the third possibility as a 
"facial challenge" and does not intend it to be the holding. 
{
Nevertheless, I think the reasoning of his opinion supports that 
holding more clearly than either of the two alternatives. 
The opinion ~ns by stating that the Court will decide only 
whether the denial of the permit to this home was a denial of 
equal protection. It e !Eli~~ states that t he Cour t will not 
7 decide _whether the city m y neve?-requr re a permit for tfie---
mentar"".lY~~ne. e ana ysis on pages 14 - 16 
the~eals Wi th ~considerations that seemingly have little to do 
with the denial of the permit to this home, or the permit 
requirement as applied to this home, but rather entail the 
legitimacy of the permit requirement for all homes for mentally 
retarded, but not for other R-3 uses. Throughout the section, 
Justice White compares the mentally retarded to other groups who 
do not need a permit at all in an R-3 zone and finds no rational 
basis for treating them differently. He does not rely on the 
particular characteristics of the occupants of this home, but 
rather analyzes the classification generally. So, for example, 
he quite o er y notes t at t er 1s no reason to think that the 
500-year flood plain, population density, or traffic concerns ar 
relevant to homes for the mentally retarded, but not to nursing 
l 
homes, fraternities, boarding houses, etc. Thus, I think Justic 
White's analysis logically supports the view that there is no 
rational basis for the permit requirement itself. 
Alternatively, one could interpret the opinion as saying that 
there is no rational basis for requiring this group home to get a 
permit. But the opinion doesn't discuss the characteristics of 
this particular home. 
Despite this, Justice White fj e~en!l~ ~~ates that the 
· 'o al wrong in this case is ~he d~o i he permit, 
erm1t re ui ement. There may be at least one practical 
problem witn the use of this language: under the Cleburne scheme, 
permits must be renewed annually. Why should this home have to 
renew its permit every year if it is not different in any 
relevant respect f~om fraternities, nursing homes, etc., which 
need not get permits at all? It may be that a foot~te c ould 
take care of this roblem. Such a no te cou ra- state that absent 
change c1r urns ances (i. e., changes in the character of the 
home's residents or the permit scheme generally), renewals may 
not be denied to this home. Once a home obtains a permit, the 
presumption that it is different from uses that do not need an 
initial permit disappears and renewals should be automatic in the 
absence of relevant changes. 
( 
Finally, the opinion does not mention that the Cleburne 
ordinance lumps the mentally retarded with drug addicts, 
alcoholics, and the insaoe. As you have pointed out repeatedly, 
this classification suggests irrational prejudice at the heart of 
the legislative scheme. 
I'm not sure what to recommend at this point. Much of Justice 
White's reasoning is quite good and supports your position for a 
"facial" challenge better than it supports his position for an 
"as applied" challenge. The opinion is not as logical as it 
could be, because of Justice White's insistence on a somewhat 
artificial distinction between facial and as applied challenges. 
Still, he has changed the opinion to decide the constitutional 
question and a footnote on annual r ewals rna take care of the 
only practical proble w1 h h1s approach. 
an! 6/14/85 
To: Justice Powell 
From: Annmarie 
Re: City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center 
Supplemental memo 
Upon further reflection, I'm not sure that the problems in 
Justice White's opinion can be solved by adding a footnote on 
annual renewals. The respP.nreally complain of two different 
actions by the City -- ~~equirement that they-9et a 2~ rmit in 
the first place, and t~denial of the permi t. As I explained 
earlier, Justice White's op [ ni on dOes not clearly di~ferentiate 
these two things, blrr: I think Just ice~e means t ~a idate 
'?~ e d n of the ermi t. If1:1TtSTrue, en his op1n1on 
does not dispose o 
1
all of the issues in the case. It is not 
eno ugfi t~tnat' the per~ ·srroa ia n o t ~ve been withheld from 
resps when they contend that they should not be required to 
obtain a permit. I think it is possible to deal with the permit 
requir~ on an "as appli~d" bas1s, an~s I ~dOn,..t t iilnR:- it 
is"" necessariT y-'incons i stentw 1tFi ~ustice White's views to have 
the Court resolve whetAer the City may require this group home to 
obtain a permit • 
. .. 
June 15, 1985 
84-468 Cleburne 
Dear Byron: 
I have read the thirll oraft: of your opin:ion a~­
dressing the validity of the ordinance on an as-applied 
basis. r agree with what you have written and - though I 
continue to think the ordinance is facially invalld I will 
make the fifth vote for your opinion if you clarify one 
point that I think is important. 
Mv understanding is that the respondents chal-
lenged the orc'Hnance as applied on two grounds: (i) the 
requirement of a permit, ano (ii) the denial of the permit. 
As I read your opinion, vou conclude that the denial of the 
permit was irrational under eaual o~otection analysis. This 
leaves unanswered whether the requirement for a special use 
p~rmit tn this case itself violated the Equal Protection 
Clause. As you note on p. 13, the R-3 zone permits a wide 
varietv of uses, but. requires a special use pet"mit only for 
the "insane or feeble minded or alcoholic or d rug addicts". 
Nothinq in the record suooorts or i~entifies anv legitimate 
city interest that justifies th5.s sing1 inq out of homes for 
the mentally retarded or for treating them as invariably 
comparable to homes for the insane, alcoholic~ and drug 
addicts. 
I believe that modest changes in vour opinion 
could make clear that requiring respondents to obtain a spe-
cial use permit, as well as denial of the permit, rests on 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 84-468 
CITY OF CLEBURNE, TEXAS, ET AL., PETITIONERS 
v. CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
[June .-, 1985] 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
A Texas city denied a special use permit for the operation 
of a group home for the mentally retarded, acting pursuant to 
a municipal zoning ordinance requiring permits for such 
homes. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that 
mental retardation is a "quasi-suspect" classification and that 
the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause because it 
did not substantially further an important governmental 
purpose. We hold that a lesser standard of scrutiny is ap-
propriate, but conclude that under that standard the ordi-
nance is invalid as applied in this case. 
I 
In July, 1980, respondent Jan Hannah purchased a building 
at 201 Featherston Street in the city of Cleburne, Texas, 
with the intention of leasing it to Cleburne Living Centers, 
Inc. (CLC), 1 for the operation of a group home for the men-
tally retarded. It was anticipated that the home would 
house 13 retarded men and women, who would be under the 
constant supervision of CLC staff members. The house had 
'Cleburne Living Centers, Inc., is now known as Community Living 
Concepts, Inc. Hannah is the Vice-President and part owner of CLC. 
For convenience, both Hannah and CLC will be referred to as "CLC." A 
third respondent is Advocacy, Inc., a non-profit corporation that provides 
· legal services to developmentally disabled persons. 
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four bedrooms and two baths, with a half bath to be added. 
CLC planned to comply with all applicable state and federal 
regulations. 2 
The city informed CLC that a special use permit would be 
required for the operation of a group home at the site, and 
CLC accordingly submitted a permit application. In re-
sponse to a subsequent inquiry from CLC, the city explained 
that under the zoning regulations applicable to the site, a spe-
cial use permit, renewable annually, was required for the 
construction of "[h]ospitals for the insane or feeble-minded, 
or alcoholic [sic] or drug addicts, or penal or correctional in-
stitutions." 3 The city had determined that the proposed 
2 It was anticipated that the home would be operated as a private Level 
I Intermediate Care Facility for the Mentally Retarded, or ICF-MR, 
under a program providing for joint federal-State reimbursement for resi-
dential services for mentally retarded clients. See 42 U. S. C. 
§ 1396d(a)(15); Tex. Hum. Res. Code § 32.001 et seq. ICF -MR's are cov-
ered by extensive regulations and guidelines established by the United 
States Department of Health and Human Services and the Texas Depart-
ments of Human Resources, Mental Health and Mental Retardation, and 
Health. See App. 92. See also 42 CFR § 442 et seq.; 25 Tex. Adm. Code, 
Title 40, § 27 et seq. 
3 The site of the home is in an area zoned "R-3," an "Apartment House 
District." App. 51. Section 8 of the Cleburne zoning ordinance, in perti-
nent part, allows the following uses in an R-3 district: 
"1. Any use permitted in District R-2. 
"2. Apartment houses, or multiple dwellings. 
"3. Boarding and lodging houses. 
"4. Fraternity or sorority houses and dormitories. 
"5. Apartment hotels. 
"6. Hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes or homes for convalescents or 
aged, other than for the insane or feeble-minded or alcoholics or drug 
addicts." 
"7. Private clubs or fraternal orders, except those whose chief activity is 
carried on as a business. 
"8. Philanthropic or eleemosynary institutions, other than penal 
institutions. 
"9. Accessory uses customarily incident to any of the above uses . . . " 
App. 60-61 (emphasis added). 
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group home should be classified as a "hospital for the feeble-
minded." After holding a public hearing on CLC's applica-
tion, the city council voted three to one to deny a special use 
permit. 4 
CLC then filed suit in Federal District Court against the 
city and a number of its officials, alleging, inter alia, that the 
zoning ordinance was invalid on its face and as applied be-
cause it discriminated against the mentally retarded in viola-
tion of the equal protection rights of CLC and its potential 
residents. The District Court found that "[i]f the potential 
residents of the Featherston Street home were not mentally 
retarded, but the home was the same in all other respects, its 
use would be permitted under the city's zoning ordinance," 
and that the city council's decision "was motivated primarily 
by the fact that the residents of the home would be persons 
who are mentally retarded." App. at 93, 94. Even so, the 
District Court held the ordinance and its application constitu-
tional. Concluding that no fundamental right was implicated 
and that mental retardation was neither a suspect nor a 
quasi-suspect classification, the court employed the minimum 
level of judicial scrutiny applicable to equal protection claims. 
The court deemed the ordinance, as written and applied, to 
be rationally related to the City's legitimate interests in "the 
legal responsibility of CLC and its residents, ... the safety 
and fears of residents in the adjoining neighborhood," and the 
Section 16 of the ordinance specifies the uses for which a special use per-
mit is required. These include "[h]ospitals for the insane or feeble-
minded, or alcoholic or drug addicts, or penal or correctional institutions. " 
App. 63. Section 16 provides that a permit for such a use may be issued by 
"the Governing Body, after public hearing, and after recommendation of 
the Planning Commission." All special use permits are limited to one 
year, and each applicant is required "to obtain the signatures of the prop-
erty owners within two hundred (200) feet of the property to be used." 
Ibid. 
• The City's Planning and Zoning Commission had earlier held a hearing 
and voted to deny the permit. App. 91. 
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number of people to be housed in the home. 5 !d., at 105. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, deter-
mining that mental retardation was a quasi-suspect classifica-
tion and that it should assess the validity of the ordinance 
under intermediate-level scrutiny. 726 F. 2d 191 (1984). 
Because mental retardation was in fact relevant to many leg-
islative actions, strict scrutiny was not appropriate. But in 
light of the history of "unfair and often grotesque mistreat-
ment" of the retarded, discrimination against them was 
"likely to reflect deep-seated prejudice." !d., at 197. In ad-
dition, the mentally retarded lacked political power, and their 
condition was immutable. The court considered heightened 
scrutiny to be particularly appropriate in this case, because 
the City's ordinance withheld a benefit which, although not 
fundamental, was very important to the mentally retarded. 
Without group homes, the court stated, the retarded could 
never hope to integrate themselves into the community. 6 
Applying the test that it considered appropriate, the court 
held that the ordinance was invalid on its face because it did 
not substantially further any important governmental inter-
ests. The Court of Appeals went on to hold that the ordi-
nance was also invalid as applied. 7 Rehearing en bane was 
' The District Court also rejected CLC's other claims, including the ar-
gument that the City had violated due process by improperly delegating its 
zoning powers to the owners of adjoining property. Cf. State of Washing-
ton ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U. S. 116 (1928). App. 
105. The Court of Appeals did not address this argument , and it has not 
been raised by the parties in this Court. 
6 The District Court had found that 
"[g]roup homes currently are the principal community living alternatives 
for persons who are mentally retarded. The availability of such a home in 
communities is an essential ingredient of normal living patterns for persons 
who are mentally retarded, and each factor that makes such group homes 
harder to establish operates to exclude persons who are mentally retarded 
from the community." App. 94. 
7 The City relied on a recently passed State regulation limiting group 
homes to six residents in support of its argument that the CLC home would 
be overcrowded with thirteen. But, the Court of Appeals observed, the 
84-46&--0PINION 
CLEBURNE v. CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER 5 
denied with six judges dissenting in an opinion urging en 
bane consideration of the panel's adoption of a heightened 
standard of review. We granted certiorari,-- U. S. --
(1984). 8 
II 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment commands that no state shall "deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," which 
is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated 
should be treated alike. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U. S. 202, 216 
City had failed to justify its apparent view that any other group of thirteen 
people could live under these allegedly "crowded" conditions, nor had it ex-
plained why six would be acceptable but thirteen not. 
CLC concedes that it could not qualify for certification under the new 
Texas regulation. Tr. Oral Arg. 31 (April 23, 1985). The Court of Ap-
peals stated that the new regulation applied only to applications made after 
May 1, 1982, and therefore did not apply to the CLC home. 726 F. 2d, at 
202. The regulation itself contains no grandfather clause, see App. 78-81, 
and the District Court made no specific finding on this point. See App. 96. 
However, the State has asserted in an amicus brief filed in this Court that 
"'the six bed rule' would not pose an obstacle to the proposed Featherston 
Street group home at issue in this case." ·Brief for the State of Texas and 
the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation as Amici 
Curiae 15, n. 7. If the six-bed requirement were to apply to the home, 
there is a serious possibility that CLC would no longer be interested in in-
junctive relief. David Southern, an officer of CLC, testifed that "to break 
even on a facility of this type, you have to have at least ten or eleven resi-
dents." App. 32. However, because CLC requested damages as well as 
an injunction, see App. 15, the case would not be moot. 
8 Macon Association for Retarded Citizens v. Macon-Bibb County 
Planning and Zoning Commisssion, 314 S. E. 2d 218 (Ga.), dismissed for 
want of a substantial federal question,-- U. S. -- (1984), has no con-
trolling effect on this case. Macon Association for Retarded Citizens in-
volved an ordinance that had the effect of excluding a group home for the 
retarded only because it restricted dwelling units to those occupied by a 
single family, defined as no more than four unrelated persons. In Village 
of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U. S. 1 (1974), we upheld the constitutionality 
of a similar ordinance, and the Georgia Supreme Court in Macon Associa-
tion specifically held that the ordinance did not discriminate against the re-
tarded. 314 S. E . 2d, at 221. 
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(1982). Section 5 of the Amendment empowers Congress to 
enforce this mandate, but absent controlling Congressional 
direction, the Courts have themselves devised standards for 
determining the validity of state legislation or other offical 
action that is challenged as denying equal protection. The 
general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and 
will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Schweiker 
v. Wilson, 450 U. S. 221, 230 (1981); United States Railroad 
Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U. S. 166, 174-175 (1980); 
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93, 97 (1979); New Orleans v. 
Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 303 (1976). When social or economic 
legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the 
states wide latitude, United States Railroad Retirement 
Board v. Fritz, supra, at 174 (1980); New .Orleans v. Dukes, 
supra, at 303, and the Constitution presumes that even im-
provident decisions will eventually be rectified by the demo-
cratic processes. 
The general rule gives way, however, when a statute clas-
sifies by race, alienage or national origin. These factors are 
so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state 
interest that laws grounded in such considerations are 
deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy-a view that those 
in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as oth-
ers. For these reasons and because such discrimination is 
unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means, these laws 
are subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if 
they are suitably tailored to a serve a compelling state 
intersts. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U. S. 184, 192 (1964); 
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U. S. 365 (1971). Similar over-
sight by the courts is due when state laws impinge on per-
sonal rights protected by the Constitution. Kramer v. 
Union Free School District No. 15, 395 U. S. 621 (1969); 
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618 (1969); Skinner v. Okla-
homa, 316 U. S. 535 (1942). 
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Legislative classifications based on gender also call for a 
heightened standard of review. That factor generally pro-
vides no sensible ground for differential treatment. "[W]hat 
differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelli-
gence or physical disability . . . is that the sex characteristic 
frequently bears no relationship to ability to perform or con-
tribute to society." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677, 
686 (1973) (plurality opinion). Rather than resting on mean-
ingful considerations, statutes distributing benefits and bur-
dens between the sexes in different ways very likely reflect 
outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men and 
women. A gender classification fails unless it is substan-
tially related to a sufficiently important governmental inter-
est. Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U. S. 
718 (1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190 (1971). Because 
illegitimacy is beyond the individual's control and bears "no 
relation to the individual's ability to participate in and con-
tribute to society," Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. 495, 505 
(1976), official discriminations resting on that characteristic 
are also subject to somewhat heightened review. Those re-
strictions "will survive equal protection scrutiny to the ex-
tent that they are substantially related to a legitimate state 
interest." Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U. S. 91, 99 (1982). 
We have declined, however, to extend heightened review 
to differential treatment based on age: 
While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not 
been wholly free of discrimination, such persons, unlike, 
say, those who have been discriminated against on the 
basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a 
"history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been sub-
jected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped 
characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities. 
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 
u. s. 307, 313 (1976). 
The lesson of Murgia is that where individuals in the group 
affected by a law have distinguishing characteristics relevant 
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to interests the state has the authority to implement, the 
courts have been very reluctant, as they should be in our fed-
eral system and with our respect for the separation of pow-
ers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to whether, 
how and to what extent those interests should be pursued. 
In such cases, the Equal Protection Clause requires only a 
rational means to serve a legitimate end. 
III 
Against this background, we conclude for several reasons 
that the Court of Appeals erred in holding mental retardation 
a quasi-suspect classification calling for a more exacting 
standard of judicial review than is normally accorded eco-
nomic and social legislation. First, it is undeniable, and it is 
not argued otlierwise here, that those who are mentally re-
tarded have a reduced ability to cope with and function in the 
everyday world. Nor are they all cut from the same pattern: 
as the testimony in this record indicates, they range from 
those whose disability is not immediately evident to those 
who must be constantly cared for. 9 They are thus different, 
9 Mentally retarded individuals fall into four distinct categories. The 
vast majority-approximately 89%-are classified as "mildly" retarded, 
meaning that their IQ is between 50 and 70. Approximately 6% percent 
are "moderately" retarded, with IQs between 35 and 50. The remaining 
two categories are "severe" (IQs of 20 to 35) and "profound" (IQs below 
20). These last two categories together account for about 5% of the men-
tally retarded population. App. 39 (testimony of Dr. Philip Roos). 
Mental retardation is not defined by reference to intelligence or IQ 
alone, however. The American Association on Mental Deficiency (AAMD) 
has defined mental retardation as "significantly subaverage general intel-
lectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior 
and manifested during the developmental period." Brief for AAMD et al. 
as Amici Curiae 3 (quoting AAMD, Classification in Mental Retardation 1 
(H. Grossman ed. 1983)). "Deficits in adaptive behavior" are limitations 
on general ability to meet the standards of maturation, learning, personal 
independence, and social responsibility expected for an individual's age 
level and cultural group. !d., at 4, n. 1. Mental retardation is caused by 
a variety of factors, some genetic, some environmental, and some un-
known. I d., at 4. 
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immutably so, in relevant respects, and the states' interest in 
dealing with and providing for them is plainly a legitmate 
one. 10 How this large and diversified group is to be treated 
under the law is a difficult and often a technical matter, very 
much a task for legislators guided by qualified professionals 
and not by the perhaps ill-informed opinions of the judiciary. 
Heightened scrutiny inevitably involves substantive judg-
ments about legislative decisions, and we doubt that the 
predicate for such judicial oversight is present where the 
classification deals with mental retardation. 
Second, the distinctive legislative response, both national 
and state, to the plight of those who are mentally retarded 
demonstrates not only that they have unique problems, but 
also that the lawmakers have been addressing their difficul-
ties in a manner that belies a continuing antipathy or preju-
dice and a corresponding need for more intrusive oversight 
by the judiciary. Thus, the federal government has not only 
outlawed discrimination against the mentally retarded in fed-
erally funded programs, see § 504 of the Rehabilitation Ac of 
1973, 29 U. S. C. § 794, but it has also provided the retarded 
with the right to receive "appropriate treatment, services, 
and habilitation" in a setting that is "least restrictive of 
[their] personal liberty." Developmental Disabilities and 
Bill of Rights Act, 42 U. S. C. § 6010(1), (2). In addition, 
the government has conditioned federal education funds on a 
State's assurance that retarded children will enjoy an educa-
10 As Dean Ely has observed: 
"Surely one has to feel sorry for a person disabled by something he or she 
can't do anything about, but I'm not aware of any reason to suppose that 
elected officials are unusually unlikely to share that feeling. Moreover, 
classifications based on physical disability and intelligence are typically ac-
cepted as legitimate, even by judges and commentators who assert that im-
mutability is relevant. The explanation, when one is given, is that those 
characteristics (unlike the one the commentator is trying to render sus-
pect) are often relevant to legitimate purposes. At that point there's not 
much left of the immutability theory, is there?" J. Ely, Democracy and 
Distrust 150 (1980) (footnote omitted). See also id., at 154-155. 
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tion that, "to the maximum extent appropriate," is integrated 
with that of non-mentally retarded children. Education of 
the Handicapped Act, 20 U. S. C. § 1412(5)(B). The govern-
ment has also facilitated the hiring of the mentally retarded 
into the federal civil service by exempting them from the re-
quirement of competitive examination. See 5 CFR 
§ 213-3102(t) (1984). The State of Texas has similarly en-
acted legislation that acknowledges the special status of the 
mentally retar~ed by conferring certain rights upon them, 
such as "the right to live in the least restrictive setting appro-
priate to [their] individual needs and abilities," including "the 
right to live . . . in a group home." Mentally Retarded Per-
sons Act of 1977, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 5547-300, 
§ 7.11 
Such legislation thus singling out the retarded for special 
treatment reflects the real . and undeniable differences be-
tween the retarded and others. That a civilized and decent 
society expects and approves such legislation indicates that 
governmental consideration of those differences in the vast 
majority of situations is not only legitimate but desirable. It 
may be, as CLC contends, that legislation designed to bene-
fit, rather than disadvantage, the retarded would generally 
withstand examination under a test of heightened scrutiny. 
See Brief for Respondents 38-41. The relevant inquiry, 
however, is whether heightened scrutiny is constitutionally 
mandated in the first instance. Even assuming that many of 
these laws could be shown to be substantially related to an 
important governmental purpose, merely requiring the legis-
lature to justify its efforts in these terms may lead it to re-
11 CLC originally sought relief under the Act, but voluntarily dismissed 
this pendent state claim when the District Court indicated that its presence 
might make abstention appropriate. The Act had never been construed 
by the Texas courts. App. 12, 14, 84-87. 
A number of states have passed legislation prohibiting zoning that ex-
cludes the retarded. See, e. g., Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 1566 et seq.; 
Conn. Gen Stat. § 8-3e; N. D. C. C. § 25-16-14(2); R. I. Gen. Laws. Tit. 
45, ch. 24 § 22. See also Md. Ann. Code, Health-General Article, § 7-102. 
84-4~0PINION 
CLEBURNE v. CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER 11 
frain from acting at all. Much recent legislation intended to 
benefit the retarded also assumes the need for measures that 
r¢ght be perceived to disadvantage them. The Education of 
the Handicapped Act, for example, requires an ·"appropriate" 
education, not one that is equal in all respects to the educa-
tion of non-retarded children; clearly, admission to a class 
that exceeded the abilities of a retarded child would not be 
appropriate. 12 Similarly, the Developmental Disabilities Act 
and the Texas act give the retarded the right to live only in 
the "least restrictive setting" appropriate to their abilities, 
implicitly assuming the need for at least some restrictions 
that would not be imposed on others. 13 Especially given the 
wide variation in the abilities and needs of the retarded them-
selves, governmental bodies must have a certain amount of 
flexibility and freedom from judicial oversight in shaping and 
limiting their remedial efforts. 
Third, the legislative response, which could hardly have oc-
curred and survived without public support, negates any 
claim that the mentally retarded are politically powerless in 
the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of 
the lawmakers. Any minority can be said to be powerless to 
assert direct control over the legislature, but if that were a 
criterion for higher level scrutiny by the courts, much eco-
nomic and social legislation would now be suspect. 
Fourth, if the large and amorphous class of the mentally 
retarded were deemed quasi-suspect for the reasons given by 
the Court of Appeals, it would be difficult to find a principled 
way to distinguish a variety of other groups who have per-
12 The Act, which specifically included the mentally retarded in its defini-
tion of handicapped, see 20 U. S. C. § 1401(1), also recognizes the great 
variations within the classification of retarded children. The Act requires 
that school authorities devise an "individualized eduational program," id., 
at § 1401(19), that is "tailored to the unique needs of the handicapped 
child." Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U. S. 176, 181 (1982). 
18 The Developmental Disabilities Act also withholds public funds from 
any program that does not prohibit the use of physical restraint "unless ab-
solutely necessary." 42 U. S. C. § 6010(2). 
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haps immutable disabilities setting them off from others, who 
cannot themselves mandate the desired legislative responses, 
and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part 
of the public at large. One need mention in this respect only 
the aging, the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm. We 
are reluctant to set out on that course, and we decline to do 
so. 
Doubtless, there have been and there will continue to be 
instances of discrimination against the retarded that are in 
fact invidious, and that are properly subject to judicial cor-
rection under constitutional norms. But the appropriate 
method of reaching such instances is not to create a new 
quasi-suspect classification and subject all governmental ac-
tion based on that classification to more searching evaluation. 
Rather, we should look to the likelihood that governmental 
action premised on a particular classification is valid as a gen-
eral matter, not merely to the specifics of the case before us. 
Because mental retardation is a characteristic that the gov-
ernment may legitimately take into account in a wide range 
of decisions, and because both state and federal governments 
have recently committed themselves to assisting the re-
tarded, we will not presume that any given legislative action, 
even one that disadvantages retarded individuals, is rooted in 
considerations that the Constitution will not tolerate. 
Our refusal to recognize the retarded as a quasi-suspect 
class does not leave them entirely unprotected from !nvidious 
discrimination. To withstand equal protection review, legis-
lation that distinguishes between the mentally retarded and 
others must be rationally related to a legitimate govern-
mental purpose. This standard, we believe, affords govern-
ment the latitude necessary both to pursue policies designed 
to assist the retarded in realizing their full potential, and to 
freely and efficiently engage in activities that burden the re-
tarded in what is essentially an incidental manner. The 
State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an 
asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction ar-
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bitrary or irrational. See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U. S. 55, 
61-63; United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 
413 U. S. 528, 535 (1973). Furthermore, some objectives-
such as "a bare .. · . desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group;" Moreno, 413 U. S., at 534--are not legitimate state 
interests. See also Zobel, supra, 457 U. S., at 63. Beyond 
that, the mentally retarded, like others, have and retain their 
substantive constitutional rights in addition to the right to be 
treated equally by the law. 
IV 
We turn to the issue of the validity of the zoning ordinance 
insofar as it requires a special use permit for homes for the 
mentally retarded. 14 We inquire first whether requiring a 
special use permit for the Featherston home in the circum-
stances here deprives respondents of the equal protection of 
the laws. If it does, there will be no occasion to decide 
whether the special use permit provision is facially invalid 
where the mentally retarded are involved, or to put it an-
other way, whether the city may never insist on a special use 
permit for a home for the mentally retarded in an R-3 zone. 
This is the preferred course of adjudication since it enables 
courts to avoid making unnecessarily broad constitutional 
judgments. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades,-- U. S. --, 
- (1985); United States v. Grace, 461 U. S. 171 (1983); 
NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415 (1963). 
The constitutional issue is clearly posed. The City does 
not require a special use permit in an R-3 zone for apartment 
houses, multiple dwellings, boarding and lodging houses, fra-
ternity or sorority houses, dormitories, apartment hotels, 
hospitals, sanitariums, nursing homes for convalescents or 
the aged (other than for the insane or feeble-minded or alco-
holics or drug addicts), private clubs or fraternal orders, and 
14 It goes without saying that there is nothing before us with respect to 
the va]idity of requiring a special use permit for the other uses listed in the 
ordinance. See n. 3, supra. 
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other specified uses. It does, however, insist on a special 
permit for the Featherston home, and it does so, as the Dis-
trict Court found, because it would be a facility for the men-
tally retarded. May the city require the permit for this fa-
cility when other care and multiple dwelling facilities are 
freely permitted? 
It is true, as already pointed out, that the mentally re-
tarded as a group are indeed different from others not shar-
ing their misfortune, and in this respect they may be differ-
ent from those who would occupy other facilities that would 
be permitted in an R-3 zone without a special permit. But 
this difference is largely irrelevant unless the Featherston 
home and those who would oc;cupy it would threaten legiti-
mate interests of the city in a way that other permitted uses 
such as boarding houses and hospitals would not. Because in 
our view the record does not reveal any rational basis for be-
lieving that the Featherston home would pose any special 
threat to the city's legitimate interests, we affirm the judg-
ment below insofar as it holds the ordinance invalid as applied 
in this case. 
The District Court found that the City Council's insistence 
on the permit rested on several factors. First, the Council 
was concerned with the negative attitude of the majority of 
property owners located within 200 feet of the Featherston 
facility, as well as with the fears of elderly residents of the 
neighborhood. But mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsub-
stantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a zon-
ing proceeding, is not a permissible basis for treating a home 
for the mentally retarded differently from apartment houses, 
multiple dwellings, and the like. It is plain that the elector-
ate as a whole, whether by referendum or or otherwise, could 
not order city action violative of the Equal Protection clause, 
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 
U. S. 713, 736-737 (1964), and the City may not avoid the 
strictures of that Clause by deferring to the wishes or objec-
tions of some fraction of the body politic. "Private biases 
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may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, di-
rectly or indirectly, give them effect." Palmore v. Sidoti, 
- u. s. -, - (1984). 
Second, the Council had two objections to the location of 
the facility. It was concerned that the facility was across the 
street from a junior high school, and it feared that the stu-
dents might harass the occupants of the Featherston home. 
But the school itself is attended by about 30 mentally re-
tarded students, and denying a permit based on such vague, 
undifferentiated fears is again permitting some portion of the 
community to validate what would otherwise be an equal pro-
tection violation. The other objection to the home's location 
was that it was located on "a five hundred year flood plain." 
This concern with the possibility of a flood, however, can 
hardly be based on a distinction between the Featherston 
home and, for example, nursing homes, homes for convales-
cents or the aged, or sanitariums or hospitals, any of which 
could be located on the Featherston site without obtaining a 
special use permit. The same may be said of another con-
cern of the Council-doubts about the legal responsibility for 
actions which the mentally retarded might take. If there is 
no concern about legal responsibility with ·respect to other 
uses that would be permitted in the area, such as boarding 
and fraternity houses, it is difficult to believe that the groups 
of mildly or moderately mentally retarded individuals who 
would live at 201 Featherston would present any different or 
special hazard. 
Fourth, the Council was concerned with the size of the 
home and the number of people that would occupy it. The 
District Court found, and the Court of Appeals repeated, 
that "if the potential residents of the Featherston Street 
home were not mentally retarded, but the home was the 
same in all other respects, its use would be permitted under 
the city's zoning ordinance." App. 93; 726 F. 2d, at 200. 
Given this finding, there would be rio restrictions on the num-
ber of people who could occupy this home as a boarding 
l 
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house, nursing home, family dwelling, fraternity house, or 
dormitory. The question is whether it is rational to treat the 
mentally retarded differently. It is true that they suffer dis-
ability not shared by others; but why this difference warrants 
a density regulation that others need not observe is not .at all 
apparent. At least this record does not clarify how, in this 
connection, the characteristics of the intended occupants of 
the Featherston home rationally justify denying to those oc-
cupants what would be permitted to groups occupying the 
same site for different purposes. Those who would live in 
the Featherston home are the type of individuals who, with 
supporting staff, satisfy federal and state standards for group 
housing in the community; and there is no dispute that the 
home would meet the federal square-footage-per-resident re-
quirement for facilities of this type. See 42 CFR § 442, 447 
(1984). In the words of the Court of Appeals, "The City 
never justifies its apparent view that other people can live 
under such 'crowded' conditions when mentally retarded per-
sons cannot." 726 F. 2d, at 202. 
In the courts below the city also urged that the ordinance is 
aimed at avoiding concentration of population and at lessen-
ing congestion of the streets. These concerns obviously fail 
to explain why apartment houses, fraternity and sorority 
houses, hospitals and the like, may freely locate in the area 
without a permit. So, too, the expressed worry about fire 
hazards, the serenity of the neighborhood, and the avoidance 
of danger to other residents fail rationally to justify singling 
out a home such as 201 Featherston for the special use per-
mit, yet imposing no such restrictions on the many other uses 
freely permitted in the neighborhood. 
The short of it is that requiring the permit in this case ap-
pears to us to rest on an irrational prejudice against the men-
tally retarded, including those who would occupy the 
Featherston facility and who would live under the closely su-
pervised and highly regulated conditions expressly provided 
for by state and federal law. 
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The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed insofar as 
it invalidates the zoning ordinance as applied to the 
Featherston home. The judgment is otherwise vacated. 
It is so ordered. 
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the brief as an appendix, does not address what local authorities 
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September 1, 1985, providing that "family homes" are 
permitted uses in "all residential zones or districts 
in this state." The statute defines a "family home" as 
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disabled persons, including the mentally retarded, 
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not appear to affect the City's actions with regard to 
group homes that plan to house more than six residents. 
The enactment of this legislation therefore does not 
affect our disposition of this case. 
:~ 
CHAMI!IERS Of" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
i'upr.tnu Qiltltrl qf tlft ~ttittb, ~btttg 
Jru!tington. ~. ~ 2ll~'4-~ 
June 19, 1985 
Re: 84-468 - City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center 
Dear Byron: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
.-
CHAMIIEAS 0,. 
.JUSTICE eYRON R . WHITE 
hFtmt C!J&tUri of lift ~lb' 1\tatu' 
,..fringtou. ~. ell· 20~~, 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
June 19, 1985 
Re: 84-468 - City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center 
Petitioners have filed · a' motion for leave to file a 
supplemental brief and a supplemental brief. I have asked Al 
Stevas to add it to this week's list, and it should be discussed. 
The brief points to the recent enactment of a Texas statute that 
effectively prohibits the exclusion from residential zoning 
districts of group homes that serve six or fewer mentally 
retarded residents. Respondents have filed a response - opposing 
the motion, which Al Stevas will circulate today. Although I 
would grant the motion, I see nothing in the brief that affects 
the result or the opinion in this case. Petitioners argue that 
after the statute takes effec~ on September 1, 1985, CLC will be 
able to house no more t'Qan six residents at 201 Featherston. 
Supplemental Brief at 3. _ But the statute, which is attached to 
the brief as an appendix, do_es not address what _local authorities 
may do with regard · to group - homes that serve more than six 
residents. Presumably, the situation with ·regard to such homes 
will be no different after the statute is enacted: as far as 
state law is concerned, the City may require or not require 
permits for such homes, as it sees fit. 
Assuming that the Court grants petitioners' motion for leave 
to file this brief, I intend to add the following paragraph to 
the end of footnote 7, on page 5 of the currently circulating 
draft: 
After oral argument, the City brought to our attention 
the recent enactment of a Texas statute, effective 
September 1, 1985, providing that "family homes• are 
permitted uses in "all residential zones or districts 
in this state." The statute defines a "family home" as 
a community-based residence housing no more than six 
disabled persons, including the mentally retarded, 
along with two supervisory personnel. The statute does 
not appear to affect the City's actions with regard to 
group homes that plan to house more than six residents. 
The enactment of this legislation therefore does not 
affect our disposition of this case. 
_9 ~1-, ~ ~ 11.uAJ A~)Mh 
/' • u: .' j1r t1 f)G"\ h / (¥ --{JL 
June 20, 1985 
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NOT YOTI NG 
CHAMI5ERS 01'" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
J)u.prtntt (!fourl of tltt ~b J)tatts 
._ulfinghtn. ~. <If. 2ll~'!~ 
June 24, 1985 
Re: No. 84-468 - City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center 
Dear John: 
In your June 21 draft concurrence, you have enlarged note 6 
(page 3) quoting your "especially vigilant" language from 
Matthews v. Lucas. 
That seems to me inconsistent with what I read your initial 
draft to advocate, i.e., opposition to the range of tests; it 
f.eems to me this footnote may well be read as suggestinrj yet 
another level or "test" of "especially vigilant" scrutiny at 
least for illegitimacy. 
I can join your earlier draft which did not tie me so 
pointedly to your Matthews dissent, but your second draft 
unhinges mel 
Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
.inprnnt Oftturi ttf tlrt ~tb .§taft# 
Jla.glfinghtn, ~. Of. 20~'!~ 
June 26, 1985 
84-468 - City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
v. Cleburne Living Center 
Dear Thurgood, 
I shall recirculate in this case by 
adding to footnote 7 the few lines mentioned 
in my Memorandum to the Conference of- June 
19, which referred to a new Texas statute. 
But I shall at this late date forego any 
response to your dissenting opinion. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
·. 
CHAMI!IERS 01" 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~tutt <!Jour! of lift Jlnittb .itatt• 
-u~ ~. <!J. 21T~"c1 
, # •• 
June 27, 1985 
Re: No. 84-468, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please JOln me in your opinion concurring in the judgment 
in part and dissenting in part. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
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